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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement 
(THCSRR) model, a new tool which has been developed to estimate the level and 
composition of medical manpower readiness requirements for the Navy. A brief 
description of the events leading up to the creation of the model is presented to 
explain not only the impetus behind it but also the environment under which it was 
constructed. The process of preparing the Program Objectives Memoranda 
(POMs) is then described, with the primary focus on Navy medical manpower. 
The primary components, underlying principals and assumptions behind the model 
are explained in detail, followed by an assessment of the principal drivers of the 
model and tradeoff possibilities which may be used in future make-buy decisions 
for Navy Medicine. Finally, conclusions reached from the analytical research and 
implications for the future based on this model are addressed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a medical 
establishment for two unique yet interwoven reasons. First, 
and perhaps foremost from a military standpoint, is the need 
to meet wartime demands for medical care and maintain the 
medical readiness of uniformed personnel in peacetime so they 
can mobilize in the event of hostilities. This is often 
referred to as the "wartime mission". The second function 
entails providing health care to 8.5 million beneficiaries, 
including retirees and their dependents, active duty 
dependents, and survivors. The law requires the DoD to 
provide this second mission, known as the "peacetime benefit"; 
however, the law also stipulates that this care is to be 
provided on a space available basis in military health care 
facilities.1 It is important to note that these two missions 
both complement and conflict with one another and decisions 
concerning the wartime segment undoubtedly affect the 
peacetime portion. 
This already complex relationship, combined with the 
ability to substitute civilians in the peacetime portion, 
distinguishes the medical community as unique among most other 
military communities. Decisions regarding trade-offs between 
active duty and civilian health care providers should include 
estimates of the expected benefits and costs to society and 
not those realized solely by the Federal Government.2 These 
are vital considerations for financial and community managers 
^•Title 10 U.S. Code Armed Forces, Chapter 55, April 
1993. 
20ffice of Management and Budget, Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Programs, CIRCULAR NO. A-94, 29 October 1992, p. 5. 
when sizing the force, whether that size is based on the 
wartime mission, peacetime benefit, or a combination thereof. 
It is difficult to find a single accepted definition of 
manpower needed for "medical readiness," largely because of 
differing opinions on whether the fulfillment of the peacetime 
benefit should be considered when discussing readiness. The 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and some of 
the services include operations in conjunction with 
beneficiary health care in the definition of medical 
readiness.3 The Navy, on the other hand, includes only the 
wartime mission and daily operational support for Navy and 
Marine Corps platforms and units when defining manpower 
readiness requirements. 
The process of determining the quantity and specialty mix 
of active duty medical personnel needed for readiness, 
regardless of how readiness is defined, has been a topic of 
repeated analysis over the years. Evaluations have 
traditionally been hampered by a lack of complete, reliable 
data on both future manpower readiness requirements and 
personnel currently available to meet medical commitments.4 
During the Cold War era, emphasis was placed less on 
determining minimum wartime medical personnel requirements 
than on military buildup. United States war plans at that 
time envisioned a global conflict similar in size to World War 
II. In this environment, the force structure was large and 
expected casualty rates were high. As a result, there were 
sufficient medical personnel on active duty to sustain the 
care of the beneficiary population at that time. 
3; 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
Medical Readiness Strategic Plan (Draft), August 1994, p. l 
4U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the 
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, House of 
Representatives, Medical Readiness:  Progress in Statinq 
Manpower Needs, April 1987, p. 18. 
Today, the political and fiscal picture is much 
different. We face threats which require smaller forces 
sustaining much lower casualty rates than previously planned. 
The military in general is now facing a situation in which the 
peacetime benefit mission could exceed the wartime mission. 
These factors, coupled with increasingly tight fiscal 
constraints, have brought the issue of "rightsizing" the total 
force structure to the forefront of the bargaining table. 
In 1991, Congress mandated a systematic review of the 
military medical care system required to support the Armed 
Forces during war or other conflict and any adjustments 
required to provide cost-effective health care in peacetime to 
covered beneficiaries.5 This report, known as the "733 
Study," is important for several reasons. 
First, it highlights the fact that Congress is struggling 
with the idea of health care in general and in particular the 
DoD system. Many of their constituents are military health 
care beneficiaries who will be directly affected by major 
changes in the Medical Health Services System (MHSS). 
Secondly, this study represents the first comprehensive 
examination of this issue undertaken by the Department since 
the end of the Cold War.6 Consequently, the results of the 
study have received much attention and scrutiny from all the 
services, including the Navy. Finally, the results of the 
wartime portion of the 733 Study themselves are significant in 
framing the issue of Navy medical readiness manpower 
requirements. 
5U.S. House of Representatives, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Section 
733, November 1991. 
6Lynn, William J., Director, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Statement 
before the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, 
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
April 1994. 
Table 1.1 shows an abbreviated version of the results of 
the study compared with resources provided in the fiscal year 
1999 defense program. The concurrent scenario was based on 
two major regional conflicts (MRC) in Southwest Asia and Korea 
as set forth by the Defense Planning Guidance and other 
national strategy documents. The augmented case included 
additional physicians for training, rotation base, and other 



























Table 1.1: Wartime Medical Requirements Comparison7 
The 733 Study conjectured that only half of the active- 
duty physicians projected to be available in fiscal year 1999 
would be required to meet wartime demands. Although the study 
went on to assess the peacetime benefit, it was the startling 
outcome of the wartime portion which further magnified the 
issue of sizing the military medical structure and prompted 
Ibid. 
the Surgeon General of the Navy to task further Navy-specific 
studies. 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) was asked to define 
medical manpower requirements unique to the Navy which were 
not covered in the 733 Study. These included day-to-day 
operations on ships, overseas (OCONUS), with the Fleet Marine 
Force (FMF) , and at isolated duty stations in the United 
States (ICONUS). Combining and refining both the wartime 
portion of the 733 Study and the CNA study became the task of 
the Surgeon General's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 
Fiscal Year 1996 Medical Assessment Task Force (PMATF). The 
result was the Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement 
(THCSRR) model, which represents a single tool to determine 
and project Navy Medicine's minimum active-duty manpower 
requirements. Once these requirements were roughly identified 
using the THCSRR, the task force created an allocation model 
which allows for distribution of these uniformed personnel to 
support the peacetime benefit. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The primary purpose of this study is to provide a 
documented description and analysis of the components of the 
THCSRR model. In doing so, factors driving the size and cost 
of Navy personnel requirements for medical readiness will also 
be delineated. This assessment will better equip financial 
managers to deal with the increasingly complex issue of 
funding military medicine. In addition, it would not only 
serve as a baseline for a more thorough review of the Army and 
Air Force medical structures, but could prove beneficial to 
line communities as well. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What are the primary components, underlying principals 
and assumptions behind the Navy Total Health Care Support 
Readiness Requirement model and how do they impact Program 
Objective Memorandum inputs? 
What percentage of current Navy medical personnel is 
associated with readiness requirements and what percentage is 
linked to the peacetime benefit according to this model? 
What are the resource and programming implications of 
changing the underlying assumptions of the model? 
What trade-offs are possible using this readiness model 
as medical endstrength levels are decreased? 
What area(s) of the model could be made more effective 
and what are the cost implications? 
What are the implications of the model for the future 
size of the Department of the Navy medical establishment? 
D.  SCOPE 
The scope of this research will be limited to 
unclassified material, therefore specific analysis of planning 
scenarios defining force levels, force arrival times and their 
effect on the medical model will be excluded. Certain 
sections of the wartime portion of the 733 Study are also 
classified and will not be discussed. Due to the recent 
nature of the events associated with this study, many of the 
sources used in the research effort were in draft form at the 
time this document was written. Final versions of these 
sources may be altered somewhat; however, continuous follow-up 
research was conducted to ensure changes did not drastically 
affect this study. Lastly, it is important to note that this 
study looks at the Navy medical community from a line 
officer's perspective. Although some of the concepts require 
a working knowledge of Navy medicine, this analysis may be 
able to provide some additional or unique insight into the 
arena of medical readiness. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Interviews were conducted with personnel from the Chief 
of Naval Operations, Medical Resources, Plans and Policy- 
Division (N931C2C), Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)), Director of Naval 
Medicine/Surgeon General of the Navy, Department of the Navy's 
Bureau of Medicine (BUMED), Office of the Secretary of Defense 
for Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD(PA&E)), Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA), Department of the Navy's Bureau of 
Personnel (BUPERS), and Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) . Instructions and regulations governing 
the Programming process as well as other sources relating to 
general model analysis, medical readiness, and manpower issues 
were reviewed. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II will both describe and analyze the process of 
preparing the Program Objective Memorandum to provide 
resources for Navy medical endstrength levels. This will 
include an examination of how programming for medical manpower 
differs from programming for other elements of the Medical 
Health Services System (MHSS). 
Chapter III will provide a detailed breakdown of the 
major components of the THCSRR model. Specific emphasis will 
be placed on the underlying principles and assumptions which 
formed the basis for model development and the rationale 
behind them. 
Chapter IV will build on the conceptual foundation laid 
out in the previous chapter to focus on identifying the 
primary drivers of the model. This will encompass both fiscal 
and endstrength drivers. An evaluation of the use of cost- 
benefit analysis which takes into account these drivers and 
associated trade-off possibilities will also be conducted. 
Finally, Chapter V will discuss conclusions reached from 
this study, including any recommendations and observations 
concerning elements of the model itself. A brief conclusion 
will highlight viability of using this model in the future and 
the resulting Navy and service-wide implications for medical 
force sizing and readiness issues. 
II.  PROGRAMMING FOR NAVY MEDICINE 
A.  PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM INTRODUCTION 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is 
a DoD management tool used to coordinate decision-making 
efforts for the proper allocation of defense resources. The 
overall goal of this process is to present Congress with valid 
budgetary requirements to support the missions of operational 
commanders within certain fiscal constraints. From a 
readiness standpoint, it is particularly important to 
understand the PPBS. It is in this arena where critical 
decisions are made regarding the proper size and type of 
forces, equipment, and infrastructure in the DoD. A model 
such as Navy Medicine's THCSRR will have to operate 
successfully within the political and organizational realm of 
this management system to compete for the fiscal resources 
necessary to maintain readiness. 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting phases all 
operate on a nearly continuous basis and, although they occur 
simultaneously and often overlap, each focuses on different 
fiscal years. For example, the following PPBS processes take 
place concurrently: 
• Budget execution for FY94 
• Congressional debate on the budget for FY95 
• Budget revisions for FY 1996-1997 
• Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development for FY 
1998-2003 
This chapter will consist of an explanation of 
programming based on a snapshot of the PPBS. However, before 
discussing the Programming phase as it relates to Navy medical 
readiness manpower requirements, it is important to outline 
certain aspects of the system as a whole and highlight the 
relationship among the three components. 
B.  PLANNING 
Planning for the DoD involves identifying national 
interests, defining national military strategies, and laying 
the groundwork for a future force structure which will 
successfully execute those strategies.8 As this phase is 
designed to focus on the long term, it encompasses a period of 
two to eight years in the future. Milestones in the Planning 
phase include the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National 
Military Strategy Document (NMSD). Together these delineate 
not only political and economic strategies for the next decade 
but also identify national military objectives and define 
force requirements at a macro level.9 
Using inputs from the NSS, NMSD, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy develops the Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG). Perhaps the most critical document arising from this 
portion of the PPBS, the DPG serves as the foundation upon 
which much of the programming phase is based. Construction of 
the DPG is aided by members of the Defense Planning and 
Resources Board (DPRB). This committee has significant 
responsibilities in all three phases of the PPBS, including 
resolving major program and budget issues and directing 
reviews of high priority programs. 
Membership of the DPRB includes the following: 
• Deputy Secretary of Defense 
8Naval Postgraduate School, Practical Comptrollership 
Manual, March 1994, p. C-13. 
9U.S. Department of the Navy Program Information 
Center, PPBS Training Course, July 1994, pp. 31-32. 
10 
• Service Secretaries 
• Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
• Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and 
Evaluation 
• DoD Comptroller 
• Service Chiefs, Commanders-in-Chief  (CINCs), other 
leadership invited as appropriate 
• Executive Secretary:  Special Assistant to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense10 
Although the medical community does not directly 
participate in this forum, membership includes Navy leadership 
with medical assets under their responsibility. Based on all 
these inputs, the DPG provides the services with both force 
and fiscal guidance necessary to construct their program 
proposals which ultimately lead to budgets. 
Fiscal guidance comes in the form of Total Obligational 
Authority (TOA) for the next six years. TOA is defined as the 
total amount of funds available for programming in a given 
year, regardless of the year the funds are appropriated, 
obligated or expended.11 This guidance provides the overall 
fiscal limits within which the services must build programs; 
however, it does not limit funding for specific programs. 
Force guidance comes from representations of potential 
combat operations, known as Illustrative Planning Scenarios, 
which are issued in Annex A of the DPG. These scenarios 
define the nature of potential conflicts, including force 
iOppBS Training Course, op. cit., p.37. 
lxNaval Postgraduate School, Practical Comptrollership 
Manual, Glossary, March 1994, p. 23. 
11 
levels and arrival times. Combat intensities and durations 
are generated by wargames performed and interpreted by the 
Joint Staff.12 All of these factors will not only affect 
decisions regarding combat forces but also impact medical 
forces needed for wartime as well. Different combat 
intensities will naturally result in varying requirements for 
a certain quantity and skills mix of medical support. 
The DPG undergoes one final stage of development before 
it is signed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The first 
five DPRB members listed above also comprise the Executive 
Committee (EXCOM) of the DoD. This group is designed to be 
the Secretary's private sounding board, providing their views 
and recommendations on the draft DPG. After considering the 
advice of the DPRB, EXCOM, and CINCs, the Secretary of Defense 
signs out the Defense Planning Guidance and with it brings the 
Planning phase to a close. 
C.  PROGRAMMING 
While planning involves a long term outlook, programming 
concentrates more on a mid-range perspective by translating 
the DPG into a six year financial plan of packages or 
programs. This process represents a concentrated effort to 
link planning with budgeting through consensus building and 
the reallocation of resources. Programming also establishes 
a single channel for major decisions on defense programs and 
allows for continuous evaluation and assessment of those 
programs. 
Before examining the process itself, it may be beneficial 
to explain the key documents resulting from programming and 
identify the roles of instrumental players both in general and 
specifically for Navy Medicine. Organizing the discussion in 
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation, The Economics of Sizing the 
Military Medical Establishment (Draft), March 1994, p. 2. 
12 
this manner allows terms and official titles to take on extra 
meaning when the actual process is outlined. 
1.  Key Programming Documents 
The two primary outputs of the Programming phase are the 
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and the Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP). The POM represents the Secretary of the 
Navy's recommendation to the SECDEF for the application of 
Navy resources for a six year timeframe.13 Using department 
guidance and policy parameters specified by the DPG, it 
contains objectives, planned activities and cost of each 
program. It is important to note that appropriation controls 
are not in effect at the program level, allowing the Navy to 
make trade-offs between programs within the overall TOA 
constraints to create a more balanced program. POMs take 
their names from the first of the six years of the program, 
hence POM96 would include fiscal years 1996 through 2001. The 
first two years of a POM receive the most attention because 
they form the basis for the next budget submission. 
The FYDP is a publication of the decisions on the DoD's 
program which have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. 
It displays manpower, forces, costs, procurement and 
construction for approved programs. Costs are delineated for 
the prior year, current year, and the next six years. Force 
levels such as ship or aircraft inventories are displayed for 
the same eight year period plus three additional years. 
The FYDP is categorized in two ways for two distinct 
audiences. For internal use, it is organized in terms of 
eleven Major Force Programs. Examples include General Purpose 
Forces (Program 2), Research and Development (Program 6), and 
Special Operations Forces (Program 11) . Navy Medicine is 
included in Program 8, entitled Training, Medical and Other 
General Personnel Activities. Within Program 8, Navy Medicine 
13Practical Comptrollership Manual, op. cit., p. C-15, 
13 
is divided into various subprograms. Examples include medical 
in support of the Marine Corps (Program 9), with construction 
forces (Program 7) , in Naval aviation (Program 5) and medical 
Selected Reserves for backfill positions (Program 32). 
For congressional review, the FYDP is divided into 
appropriations. Navy Medicine is primarily comprised of 
appropriations for Operation and Maintenance, Military- 
Personnel, Reserve Personnel, and Research and Development. 
Medical support for the Marine Corps is performed by Navy 
personnel, therefore the Military Personnel Marine Corps 
(MPMC) appropriation is not used in programming for Navy 
Medicine. 
2. Programming Roles and Responsibilities 
A large part of understanding the concept of programming 
lies in determining exactly who is responsible for different 
aspects of the process. Overall management of the programming 
phase for the Navy is the job of two offices under the Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, 
and Assessments (N8). The Programming Division (N80) 
initiates guidance and procedures, including a schedule of 
completion dates and milestones for the process. This office 
is also responsible for final pricing and adjustments after 
program approval. The Assessment Division (N81) is more 
involved in the early stages of programming, conducting War 
Games as well as several reviews to make trade-offs between 
programs and ensure that a complete Navy investment strategy 
is attained. Both of these divisions attempt to optimize 
compliance with SECDEF, SECNAV, and CNO guidance and help keep 
the programming process in motion.14 
The primary customers include the CINCs and Major 
Claimants. For Navy Medicine, CINCs of both the Pacific and 
Atlantic Fleets would be involved in programming for items 
14PPBS Training Course, op. cit-, p. 44. 
14 
such as hospital ships. The Major Claimant for Navy Medicine 
is the Bureau of Medicine (BUMED); other claimants include 
Commander, Naval Reserve Forces, and Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) for the Fleet Hospital program. Claimants 
provide field inputs to Resource Sponsors for inclusion in the 
programming process. Consistent customer input is important 
in that it provides the expertise and day-to-day knowledge of 
customer needs and utilizes their ability to track precise 
historical execution. Ultimately, these are the organizations 
which must take the programmed resources and use them to meet 
their mission. 
Each Resource Sponsor is responsible for a distinct 
collection of programs which, when combined with those of 
other Resource Sponsors, form Navy TOA. The Resource Sponsor 
for Navy Medicine is the Surgeon General of the Navy (N093), 
although Navy medical personnel in support of the Marine Corps 
are programmed by the Office of the Director for Air Warfare 
(N88) on the CNO staff.15 Navy Resource Sponsors are 
delineated either by platform (e.g., submarine, surface, or 
aviation) or consist of separate support areas (e.g., 
medicine). The resources under their jurisdiction may support 
a number of programs in different mission areas. 
The job of a Resource Sponsor is to combine inputs from 
customers with programming guidance, develop an understanding 
of the issues, and articulate them in the programming arena. 
Most importantly, they determine how to effectively reconcile 
the claimant's multiple requirements with the amount of 
resources available.16 
15Internet interview with Lieutenant T.H. Weber, MSC, 
USN, Office of the Surgeon General of the Navy, 11 September 
1994. 
16Internet interview with Lieutenant Commander S. 
Foster, MSC, USN, Office of the Surgeon General of the Navy, 
12 August 1994. 
15 
Assessment Sponsors serve to check the programs developed 
by Resource Sponsors. They provide a broad perspective which 
includes areas of responsibility for several Resource Sponsors 
to ensure standardization when programming for common 
functions. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower 
and Personnel (Nl) and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Logistics (N4) are examples of Assessment Sponsors for Navy 
Medicine. 
The MHSS has recently undergone substantial structural 
changes which have had a major impact on medical participants 
in the PPBS. Traditionally, the MHSS has operated as four 
independent organizations: one for each of the three services 
and a fourth to manage the Civilian Health and Medical Program 
of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). The service 
organizations have been managed by the military departments 
and provided technical administration by the service Surgeons 
General, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs (ASD(HA)) managed CHAMPUS.17 
In an October 1, 1991 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense directed the creation of a unified medical program for 
medical activities within the DoD. This document, which later 
formed the basis for Program Budget Decision 742, placed 
medical personnel, facilities, programs, funding, and other 
resources within the DoD under the authority and direction of 
ASD(HA). It also consolidated the three military department 
medical budgets and programming responsibilities into a 
unified Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation under the 
jurisdiction of ASD(HA). The services, and corresponding 
Resource Sponsors, must now coordinate their efforts with 
Lamer, Jack 0., Dr. P.H., FACHE, and Colonel Boone, 
Charles, USAF, Ph.D., FACHE, "Restructuring Military Health 
Care:  The Winds of Change Blow Stronger," Hospital and 
Health Services Administration, v. 38:1, Spring 1993, p. 
16 
ASD(HA) to justify their programs and compete for scarce 
resources within their own community. More specific 
information on the DHP and interaction between the services 
and ASD(HA) will be discussed in a subsequent section of this 
chapter. 
3. Three Phases of the Programming Process 
The Programming portion of the PPBS is operated on a two- 
year cycle. Odd fiscal years are termed "non-POM" years 
because the main emphasis is on assessing and refining the 
Navy program. During even fiscal years, programs are 
developed, delivered, and reviewed. Programming consists of 
three phases: Program Assessment, POM Development, and POM 
Delivery/Review. The following subsections address each phase 
separately. 
a.     Program Assessment 
The purpose of the Program Assessment phase is to 
appraise mission and support programs and evaluate the current 
state of the Navy. The issuance of the first POM Serial by 
N80 signifies the beginning of the Programming phase. POM 
serials are a series of consecutively numbered memoranda 
distributed throughout the Programming cycle. They are used 
as a medium to promulgate areas of responsibility, direct 
those involved in the programming process, and outline changes 
as they occur. Serial Number One traditionally delineates 
goals and objectives, outlines an initial Plan of Action and 
Milestones (POA&M), and provides a discussion of the 
philosophy behind actions the Navy plans to take on a broad 
level. As the Resource Sponsor for Navy Medicine, N093 uses 
these documents to keep track of the most current situation in 
the programming arena. 
Shortly after issuance of the first POM Serial, CINC 
Maritime Concerns are submitted as the initial input into the 
Assessment phase. Issues addressed are often requested 
specifically by the CNO; however, CINCs draw on operational 
17 
experience to develop their top five maritime concerns. 
Emphasis is placed on changes to threats since the last 
program review and an assessment of the ability of forces to 
meet those threats. 
While the Navy programmers are compiling information 
for the forthcoming POM as part of Program Assessment, the 
Office of the Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) is preparing for an 
Apportionment Review as part of the Budget cycle. 
Apportionment Reviews focus on making recommendations for 
reallocation of funds between the fiscal year currently being 
executed and the next fiscal year. As an example, the FY94 
Apportionment Review would include FY94 and FY95. In order to 
accomplish this, input from programmers on the second year of 
the President's budget is requested. This input comes in the 
form of Sponsor Change Proposals (SCPs) drafted by Resource 
Sponsors. During FY94, N093 would have an opportunity to 
recommend any reprogramming in the proposed budget for FY95. 
This process is called Program Review and, although 
intertwined with budgeting, is often considered as part of the 
Program Assessment phase. 
At this stage of assessing Navy programs, field 
input is provided by Major Claimants. This includes fleet 
commanders, systems commands and others such as BUMED. Each 
claimant is allowed to submit up to 25 prioritized issues, 
including program or financial offsets. These inputs are 
designed to focus on issues which are either beyond the 
capability of the claimant to resolve or will have a 
significant effect on the total Navy program.18 Inputs are 
submitted to N80 who then distributes them to appropriate 
Resource Sponsors. The top five issues must be addressed by 
the Resource Sponsor. 
18Practical Comptrollership Manual, op. cit., p. 18 
18 
In addition to this avenue, claimants and component 
commanders may also utilize POM Issue Papers to provide 
Resource Sponsors with information on their concerns and 
needs. These may come in the form of proposed changes or 
priority lists; however, recommendations for resource 
reallocation or identification of realized cost savings must 
be provided. 
All inputs to date are considered when conducting 
Joint Mission Assessments, which are comprised of Joint 
Mission Area (JMA) and Support Area (SA) Assessments. 
Designed to provide a joint perspective, analysis extends 
across platforms, Resource Sponsors and services. JMA and SA 
Assessments have replaced the "Warfare Area" and "Pillar" 
concepts as building blocks for the Navy database. The 
following is a list of the seven JMAs and the organizations 
responsible for their construction: 
• Joint Strike - N88 
• Joint Littoral Warfare - N85/N86 
• Joint Surveillance - N87/N88 
• Joint SEW/Intelligence - N6 
• Joint Deterrence - N87 
• Strategic Sealift/Protection - N86 
• Forward Presence - N83/N51 
The three SAs and the organizations who prepare them are 
provided below: 
• Readiness, Support and Infrastructure - N81 
• Manpower and Personnel - Nl 
19 
• Shore Training - N719 
Forward Presence and Shore Training represent 
assessment areas which have been added within the past year. 
In addition, a Special Programs Assessment, headed by N89, has 
been included as part of this process. Assessment of the Navy 
medical mission traditionally falls within the Readiness, 
Support and Infrastructure SA. As can be seen from the list 
above, multi-sponsor participation is key to ensuring fair 
assessment of joint capabilities and requirements. 
The War Games portion of the Assessments phase is a 
new decision-making tool designed to help assess capabilities 
against Defense Planning Guidance scenarios and strategic 
concepts. Personnel from the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Marine Corps Headquarters, and Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF) evaluate JMA and SA priorities and requirements. 
Efforts are geared toward achieving program balance and 
determining trade-offs deemed necessary between programs. 
Actual wargames are conducted by N81. 
The next step in the Program Assessments phase 
involves drafting Baseline Assessment Memoranda (BAMs) . These 
contain appraisals of the total costs and resources needed to 
achieve or maintain some stated level of capability. These 
serve as benchmarks supporting Resource Sponsors later during 
the Program Development phase. N80 tasks certain Assessment 
Sponsors with developing BAMs for specific areas or topics. 
Representative BAM issues and associated sponsors 
for POM-96 were Ship Inactivation (N4), Spares (N4), Base 
Operations (N4), Family Housing (N4), Training (N7), and 
Manpower and Personnel (Nl). Although none of these included 
Navy medical issues, Navy Medicine conducted its own baseline 
19PPBS Training Course, op. cit., p. 56, 
20 
assessment for manpower requirements.  This came in the form 
of the THCSRR model.20 
Operational CINCs are provided a means to submit 
prioritized issues through Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). 
Unlike claimants, the CINCs are not limited to a specific 
number of issues, nor are they required to identify program 
offsets. Resource Sponsors must also identify action taken on 
each issue in a CINCs' Annex to the POM. Typical issues might 
center around flying and steaming hours or specific quality of 
life programs. IPLs specifically relating to medical (called 
MIPLs) are submitted by the CINCs to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS). The JCS in turn divide these by service responsibility 
and then send them to the respective services for action 
(e.g., N093 for the Navy). The package of MIPLs is sent in 
its entirety to ASD(HA). Recent MIPL issues concerning Navy 
Medicine involved the inclusion of hospital ships in fleet 
exercises. 
The Investment Balance Review (IBR), conducted by 
N81, integrates all the various inputs to develop a composite 
picture of the Navy investment strategy to date. The IBR 
serves as a continuous review process of the JMAs and SAs to 
determine the Navy's success in filling its roles and 
missions. 
The CNO reorganization of FY93 introduced the 
Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B) to the 
Programming cycle. With N8 as its chair, this board reviews 
IBR proposals and makes recommendations which will eventually 
guide detailed work by Resource Sponsors. This final review 
also represents the culmination of DoD program assessment 
efforts.  Figure 2.1 depicts the Program Assessment phase in 
20Internet interview with Lieutenant Commander S. 
Foster, op. cit. 
21 
its entirety, including Navy medical-specific information 
where appropriate. 
b.     Program Development 
Before Resource Sponsors are able to begin 
developing their programs, additional policy and fiscal 
guidance is supplied by several sources. The Defense Planning 
Guidance outlined earlier in the chapter is promulgated at 
this time. In addition, N8 publishes guidance based on 
specific direction from the JMA and SA Assessments and the 
IBR. This comes in the form of the Department of the Navy 
Consolidated Planning and Programming Guidance (DNCPPG). 
Formats and guidelines for reporting proposals are laid out by 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (ASD(PA&E)). Members of this office also become 
key players in the POM Delivery/Review phase. 
Supplemental information specific to medical 
programs comes from the Medical Program Guidance (MPG) which 
is the province of ASD(HA). Based on these medical 
guidelines, Navy Medicine may be required to stop or start 
certain programs, increase readiness training, or show 
evidence of using civilian-based technology. Some 
requirements would be allowed to exceed historical program 
levels, while others would have to be included in the base TOA 
and would thus require offsets by other programs.21 
Fiscal guidance for POM development also comes in 
many tiers. SECDEF initially distributes shares of the 
expected resources to each military department which form TOA 
controls for each year of the FYDP. it is then the task of 
the Secretary of the Navy to determine what portion will be 
allocated to the Navy and what portion will go toward Marine 
Corps programs. This process is known as establishing the 
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allocates the Navy's share to the different Resource Sponsors 
based on BAMs, results of the JMA and SA Assessments, and 
historical levels of program funding and execution. Using 
this methodology, division of resources is no longer the 
result of a mere percentage split; rather, it is the result of 
informed decisions made in the Program Assessments phase. 
After fiscal and program guidance is distributed, 
Resource Sponsors begin formulating Sponsor Program Proposals 
(SPPs) . Usually developed in the form of a series of slide 
presentations, these initial proposals represent the 
foundation of the Navy POM and are based on the most current 
guidance and information on program changes. SPPs also must 
address priories outlined by CINC IPLs, component commanders, 
claimant Issue Papers, and Assessment Sponsors. While 
drafting SPPs and as changes are made throughout the process, 
Resource Sponsors also continually update the FYDP. 
Upon completion, SPPs are presented to N80 and 
several staff offices serving the CNO under the purview of the 
Program Development Review Committee (PDRC). This body acts 
as an initial sounding board for Resource Sponsors. Based on 
recommendations made by the PDRC, Resource Sponsors prepare 
Sponsor Program Proposal Documents (SPPDs) which are official 
documentation of program proposals and changes that aid 
customers in ensuring that their concerns and priorities are 
being addressed in the Navy POM. Also initiated by Resource 
Sponsors are Post-SPP Assessments. These are evaluations of 
programs as outlined in the SPPs to include degree of 
compliance with guidance, consistency, and program balance.22 
The final process involved in the Program 
Development phase is OPNAV Internal Review, often known as 
"end game review». This consists of three primary stages of 
review by the Navy and Marine Corps:   R3B,  Navy Staff 
22PPBS Training Course, op. cit., pp. 64-67. 
24 
Executive Steering Committee (ESC), and the Department of the 
Navy Program Strategy Board (DPSB) . The R3B reviews JMA and 
SA Assessments as well as SPPs, making adjustments as 
necessary. The CNO, Vice CNO, and Vice Admirals form the ESC 
to provide decisions on broad CNO policy issues. 
At this point, after incorporating ESC adjustments, 
SPPs are collectively known as the Tentative POM (or T-POM). 
Finally, the T-POM is reviewed by members of the DPSB which 
includes the SECNAV, Under Secretary of the Navy, CNO, CMC, 
and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. Particular 
emphasis is placed on responding to CINC IPLs and final 
program rebalancing is done to meet the DPG and fiscal 
controls. 
Based on results of the three-tiered Internal Review 
process, N80 conducts a final balancing of the POM during 
which appropriation "lock-up" takes place and POM 
documentation is prepared.23 This simply means that the 
database in which all resources are tracked is closed to 
preclude further changes. At this point, both the Navy's 
Internal Review process and the Program Development phase are 
complete. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the Program 
Development phase for Navy Medicine. 
c.     PCM Delivery/Review 
During this phase of the Programming process, both 
the updated FYDP and POM for all the services are submitted to 
OSD. It is the responsibility of ASD(PA&E) , together with the 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to collect 
all the services' POMs and develop questions, issues, and 
analysis of estimates and alternatives. If ASD(PA&E) or the 
CINCs do not concur with a service's POM, issues are developed 
for review and evaluation and are included in Issue Books. 
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Issues are grouped into one of the following eight 
categories: 
• Policy and Risk Assessment 
• Nuclear Forces 
• Conventional Forces 
• Modernization and Investment 
• Readiness and Other Logistics 
• Manpower 
• Intelligence 
• Management Initiatives24 
Recent health care issues under the Manpower 
category have centered around the size of the active duty 
medical departments in each of the services. Current interest 
in topics such as copayments and deductibles may fall under 
the realm of Policy or Management Initiatives.25 Resource 
Sponsors are given the opportunity to develop reclamas, or 
appeals, through which an issue may be resubmitted for further 
consideration. The Navy also establishes Program Review 
Groups with flexible memberships tailored to issues currently 
under debate. Medical membership would most likely include 
the ASD(HA), Bureau of Medicine and Surgery personnel, and 
other leadership, depending on the issues involved. 
Staff members from the Office of ASD(PA&E) brief the 
Issue Books in a formal presentation to the Defense Planning 
and Resources Board.  Briefings for a particular issue would 
24Ibid..   p.   C-24. 
25Internet  interview with Lieutenant Commander S 
Foster,   op.   cit. 
27 
include OSD's position on the issue (called a mark), CINC 
input, and the Resource Sponsor reclama. 
After considering recommendations from the DPRB on 
each Issue Book, the SECDEF forwards his decisions to all the 
services and defense agencies via Program Decision Memoranda 
(PDM) . The PDMs not only signify the conclusion of the 
Programming phase, they also provide further guidance for 
those involved in translating the first two years of the POM 
into a biannual budget proposal during the Budget phase. 
Figure 2.3 depicts the POM Delivery/Review phase of 
programming as it relates to Navy Medicine. 
D.  PROCEDURES/ISSUES SPECIFIC TO THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY 
The processes outlined in the previous sections are 
standard methods applicable to all communities in the Naval 
service. These serve as a template upon which additional 
requirements and variations are applied for the health care 
community. As stated in Chapter I, the complex relationship 
between its wartime mission and peacetime benefit role 
distinguishes the medical community as unique. In addition, 
health care issues in general are of extreme interest to both 
members of Congress and their constituents. This section will 
outline some of the principal differences encountered when 
allocating resources for the MHSS and explain their 
significance. 
One of the most basic differences stems from the 
existence of the Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation 
and a unified medical POM. In addition to inputs from the 
three services, there are also component field activities 
under the DHP. These include the Defense Medical Program 
Activity (DMPA), Uniformed Services University of the Health 
Sciences (USUHS), and the Office of Civilian Health and 
28 
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Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS),26 The 
DHP includes funds for Operation and Maintenance (O&M), 
Military Personnel, Other Procurement, and Military 
Construction (MILCON) for projects directly linked to medical 
facilities. 
Exceptions include Navy medical base operations and 
construction for non-medical facilities such as Bachelor 
Enlisted Quarters for hospital staff. These are funded in the 
individual services' POMs. Funding for reserve and civilian 
personnel, combat support medical units/activities, and 
management headquarters not considered Program 8 (Medical) are 
also not included in either the consolidated medical budget or 
programming documents.27 In part as a result of these 
deviations, Resource Sponsors programming for medical actually 
submit two POMs. One is provided to the Department of the 
Navy and one is submitted to ASD(HA). When combined, these 
POMs reflect the total resources programmed for Navy Medicine. 
The most significant difference between allocating 
resources for the MHSS and programming for other military 
communities involves the issue of active duty personnel. 
Funds for this purpose are included in the consolidated 
ASD(HA) medical POM; however, they are transferred to the 
military departments for budget execution. This means that 
during the year of execution, the DoD Comptroller moves funds 
from ASD(HA) to the Department of the Navy based on the 
medical endstrength programmed by N093 for Navy Medicine.28 
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs, Subject:  FY9 6-01 DHP Program Objective 
Memorandum Preparation Instructions, 2 March 1994. 
7Kearns, P., Colonel, and Norris, J., Defense Health 
Program Budget Detail, Trends, and Issues, 7 April 1993, p. 
2 8 
Internet interview with Lieutenant Commander S 
Foster, op. cit. 
30 
This relationship is illustrated by the following guidance, 
promulgated in 1993: 
The ASD(HA) POM will include military manpower 
levels and funds. The Military Department budgets 
will display the military manpower levels and funds 
as specified in the ASD(HA) POM. The Military 
Department budgets will, therefore, be above fiscal 
guidance by exactly these amounts, while the 
ASD(HA) budget will be below fiscal guidance by the 
levels and funds for military manpower specified in 
their POM.29 
Although the Navy is "reimbursed" by ASD(HA) fiscally for 
medical manpower, these active duty personnel are still 
included as part of the Navy endstrength topline numbers. 
This is an important concept to understand as it has certain 
ramifications in an environment marked by "rightsizing". If 
the Navy is required to reduce its number of active duty 
personnel, medical personnel would be included in attaining 
those targets. In the past, the Navy has been reluctant to 
cut medical personnel, therefore targets have been met 
primarily by trimming down the line community. However, the 
Navy is currently beginning to force the medical community to 
"share the pain" of downsizing efforts by taking a percentage 
of personnel reductions. These interactions result in a 
system wherein ASD (HA) holds much of the fiscal responsibility 
for health care yet decisions made by the services ultimately 
impact their medical communities. 
An additional element which must be considered when 
programming for medical endstrength is specific congressional 
action defining minimum medical endstrength numbers under 
29Memorandum from Maroni, Alice C, Principal Deputy 
Comptroller, and Lynn, William J., Director, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, 
Subject:  Programming and Budgeting for Military Pay and 
Manpower in the FY 1995-1999 Program/Budget Review Related 
to Special Operations and Medical Programs, 25 August 1993. 
31 
certain conditions. In 1990 Congress prohibited reductions in 
military and civilian health care personnel below the numbers 
of those serving on September 30, 1989.30 Limitations 
specific to the Navy are outlined in Section 718 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY92 and FY93 which 
establishes the minimum number of Navy officers serving on 
active duty in health profession specialties at 12,510. 
These acts allow cuts to be made only if ASD(HA) 
certifies to Congress that the number of personnel being 
reduced is excess to current and projected needs of the 
services and that the reduction will not increase CHAMPUS 
costs.31 In order to certify that CHAMPUS costs would not 
increase, Health Affairs uses a model consisting of several 
equations linking changes in population, inpatient and 
outpatient utilization, and medical manpower levels to changes 
in CHAMPUS workload. Table 2.1 provides medical endstrength 
information contained in the draft version of ASD(HA) 
certification for FY95. 
As can be seen by comparing numbers for the 
different services, Navy medical manpower cuts have been 
somewhat smaller than those of the other two services. This 
certification process has essentially created a "floating 
minimum" or floor on medical endstrength levels. The level of 
endstrength certified for one year becomes the minimum level 
for the next year. If certification is submitted the 
following year due to further cuts, the floor is lowered 
again. 
U.S. House of Representatives, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Section 711, 
November 1990. 
31Department of Defense, FY95 Medical Manpower Annex 
Manpower Requirements Report, May 1994, p. 2. 
32 
Baseline FY89 Certif. FY95 Proj. FY20 
USN Officer 11,555 12,130 11,711 
USN Enlisted 30,598 29,944 28,785 
USN Civilian 11,435 13,170 12,858 
USA Officer 18,185 15,842 14,793 
USA Enlisted 48,238 35,122 33,020 
USA Civilian 30,032 30,214 29,804 
AF Officer 14,711 14,131 14,118 
AF Enlisted 29,166 27,535 27,526 
AF Civilian 8,894 8,118 8,127 
Table 2.1:  DoD Health Care Endstrength Certification32 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is a 
complex process designed to involve many layers of DoD 
leadership. After examining the Programming phase in detail, 
it becomes apparent that many factors must be taken into 
account when attempting to allocate resources over a six year 
timeframe. Current national political, economic, and military 
strategies, and force guidance from planning scenarios are but 
a few of these factors. Customer feedback on day-to-day 
operations, historical funding execution, and additional 
fiscal limitations must also be considered. The Programming 
process is somewhat more involved for the medical community 
due to the unique relationship existing between the services 
32, 
'Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs, Certification for FY95 Medical Endstrength 
(Draft), July 1994, Appendix D. 
33 
and ASD(HA). Finally, the Military Health Services System 
must also contend with congressional mandates on medical 
manpower levels and certification of CHAMPUS cost containment. 
34 
III.  TOTAL HEALTH CARE SUPPORT READINESS REQUIREMENT MODEL 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
With a better understanding of the current political and 
fiscal environment and the rigorous process involved in 
programming resources for Navy medical endstrength, one can 
more fully appreciate the difficulties inherent in creating a 
manpower readiness requirement model for this community. 
Nonetheless, the Total Health Care Support Readiness 
Requirement (THCSRR) model was recently developed by the 
Surgeon Generals's POM FY96 Medical Assessment Task Force as 
part of an internal baseline assessment. As stated in Chapter 
One, the Navy does not include the peacetime benefit mission 
when defining readiness from a manpower standpoint. The 
THCSRR model, therefore, does not directly address peacetime 
manpower issues. 
The first two components of the THCSRR model revolve 
around the wartime mission and what has been termed the day- 
to-day operational mission. The wartime portion entails 
meeting demands for medical care during two nearly 
simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). The day-to-day 
mission involves supporting the Fleet and the Fleet Marine 
Force (FMF) on a daily basis in an operational capacity. The 
Medical Operational Support Requirement, or MOSR, represents 
the union of these two components. A sustainment or training 
piece constitutes a final component which is added to the MOSR 
to create the THCSRR. This chapter will examine each of the 
four components of the THCSRR model separately, including 
specific background information and concepts applicable to 
each. 
B.  WARTIME REQUIREMENT COMPONENT 
The first component of the THCSRR incorporates resources 
designed to meet Navy wartime medical requirements. Although 
this model relies heavily on the existing database created by 
35 
the congressionally mandated 733 Study, it is important to 
discuss the rationale used in the process of medical wartime 
planning. It is a complicated arena with many factors and 
assumptions which affect the quantity and type of medical 
personnel required. The THCSRR model is designed for medical 
personnel to support the Navy and Marine Corps; therefore this 
discussion will emphasize those elements of wartime medical 
requirements. 
1.  Navy and Marine Corps Medical Force Structure 
Understanding medical manpower readiness requirements 
begins with the basic organization and utilization of Navy 
medical assets during a conflict.  At the heart of this is a 
phased approach to combat casualty care designed to return 
personnel to duty as soon as possible. There are two specific 
zones into which a wartime theater of operations is divided: 
the Combat Zone and Communications Zone.  The Combat Zone 
incorporates all land, sea and airspace required to conduct 
combat operations, while the Communications Zone is the area 
behind the Combat Zone required for support.  Four layers or 
echelons of medical care are available within these two zones. 
The first three echelons occur in the Combat Zone and the 
final echelon of care operates in the Communications Zone. 
This layering of medical treatment begins with highly mobile 
yet basic care in the field and evolves to facilities with 
progressively sophisticated, less mobile medical capabilities 
farther from the front line. 
The Navy and Marine Corps combat medical structures are 
shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. In the first 
echelon, emergency care and advanced first aid are 
administered and casualties are prepared for evacuation from 
the point of illness or injury to the next echelon of care. 
This would initially be accomplished by a Navy Corpsman in a 
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mobile element of the medical support system. Also included 
in Echelon I care is the Shipboard Medical Aid Station and the 
Marine Corps Battalion Aid Station, where an appropriate plan 
of treatment can be initiated in a safer environment. 
Redressing of wounds, use of antibiotics and intravenous 
fluids is also accomplished here. 
Echelon Two centers around assembly points where 
casualties are assessed and prioritized for further 
evacuation. Initial resuscitation and other emergent care are 
provided by a team of physicians and nurses supported by a 
medical technician staff. For the Navy and Marine Corps these 
entail Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships (CRTS). These 
are amphibious ships which have secondary medical roles after 
troops debark. Certain classes of these ships maintain the 
largest medical capability of any ship currently in commission 
(with the exception of the hospital ships) . They can be 
augmented with additional medical personnel during wartime. 
As part of Echelon Two care, the Marine Corps also utilizes 
Collecting and Clearing Companies and Surgical Support 
Companies. These facilities help with initial wound surgery, 
preventive medicine and temporary hospitalization within 
Echelon Two.33 
The third echelon of medical care provides resuscitation, 
wound surgery, and post-operative treatment. It is 
characterized by more stable installations staffed and 
equipped for surgical care for patients who are not 
transportable.34 Hospital Ships (T-AHs) serve as floating 
surgical hospitals where acute medical care can be provided. 
33Department of the Navy, Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery, Medical Contingency Fact Book, August 1993, pp. 
2.2.2-.5. 
34Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Program Analysis and Evaluation, 733 Report (Draft), 
Appendix G, p. 4. 
39 
Also included in the Marine Corps structure are two sizes of 
Combat Zone Fleet Hospitals to accommodate acute casualties. 
One is geared to accommodate a 250 bed requirement while the 
other maintains a maximum capacity of 500 beds. For many- 
patients, resuscitative care constitutes the definitive 
treatment needed to return them to full duty.35 
Echelon Four of the combat medical structure consists of 
a Communications Zone Fleet Hospital and Navy overseas Medical 
Treatment Facilities (OCONUS MTFs). These hospitals carry a 
full time, dedicated staff and are designed for definitive 
rehabilitative care. The fleet hospital, which is usually 
prepositioned ashore in warehouses, and OCONUS MTFs are 
capable of performing subspecialty treatment to restore 
casualties to duty or prepare them for evacuation from the 
theater of operation. If rehabilitation is not possible 
within a specified timeframe, casualties are moved to the 
Continental United States (CONUS). Evacuation to CONUS is 
often referred to as the fifth and final echelon of care in 
the combat medical structure. Patients requiring restorative 
and rehabilitative treatment in CONUS are normally not 
returned to full duty.36 
One of the primary elements which links all of the 
echelons of medical care is evacuation policy. This is a 
decision concerning the maximum number of days of 
noneffectiveness a patient may be held for treatment within 
the theater of operation. Casualties which cannot be returned 
to active duty status within this timeframe are evacuated.37 
Having a basic knowledge of the Navy and Marine Corps medical 
Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States 
Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM 4-50), Health 
Service Support, 19 September 1990, pp. 1-6. 
36Ibid. 
37733 Report (Draft), op. cit., p. 16. 
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combat structure is critical to understanding the nature of 
how wartime requirements are formulated.   Within this 
framework of echelons of care, wartime requirements can be 
categorized as either workload-based or structure-based. 
2.  Workload-based Wartime Requirement 
Workload-based medical requirements incorporate aspects 
of care performed primarily in Echelons Three and Four.  An 
assessment of workload-based wartime medical requirements 
begins with the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) described in 
Chapter II.  Annex A of the DPG contains representations of 
potential combat operations, known as Illustrative Planning 
Scenarios (IPS), which define force levels and arrival times. 
The 733 Study utilized the scenarios issued for fiscal years 
1994-1999. This entailed conflicts in both Southwest Asia and 
Korea.  Combat intensities and durations were generated by 
wargames performed by the Joint Staff.38 
The DPG and IPS are used by all communities within the 
three services.  However, the medical community maintains an 
additional analytical tool called the Medical Planning Module 
(MPM) to translate these combat intensities into predictions 
and evaluations of medical requirements during war.  The MPM 
is a menu-driven subsystem of the Joint Operation Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is an integrated command and 
control system designed to satisfy the information needs of 
senior-level  decisionmakers  in  planning  and  executing 
mobilization, deployment, and sustainment activities.39 The 
MPM uses five levels of combat intensity sustained for periods 
of ten days in Conjunction with a geographic breakdown of the 
^Department of Defense, Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation, The Economics of Sizing the Military Medical 
Establishment (Draft), 24 March 1994, p. 2. 
National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff 
College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, AFSC PUB l 1991 
Chapter 8, p. 3. ' x:7:7-1-' 
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combat theater.40 Ultimately, it creates simulated 
admissions by flowing patients through the echelons of medical 
care and computes medical requirements such as number of 
physicians, hospital beds, operating rooms, evacuees, as well 
as blood and intravenous fluid supplies. The personnel 
requirements generated by MPM encompass non-organic medical 
personnel. In the case of the Navy and Marine Corps, this 
includes personnel who do not deploy with actual Navy and 
Marine Corps units such as Battalions or ships. 
Specific planning factors are used as input parameters 
for the MPM. Two of the most important factors include 
wounded in action (WIA) rates and disease and non-battle 
injury (DNBI) rates. These rates not only vary by service but 
have also undergone drastic changes in recent years. During 
the Cold War, WIA rates used for planning and programming 
purposes were high. These same levels were used by the 
military until 1987.41 Current IPS analysis involves lower 
overall intensities and shorter durations of high intensity 
combat which has resulted in lower anticipated WIA rates. 
Additionally, there has been a general decrease in DNBI rates 
and number of evacuees over time due to breakthroughs in the 
areas of infectious and preventative medicine. 
For the 733 Study and thus the THCSRR, a common DNBI rate 
was negotiated based on inputs from the different services and 
historical information on Korea, Vietnam, and Operation Desert 
Storm. Although a common rate was used for the study, each 
service normally bases its wartime requirements on different 
DNBI rates.  Depending on the climate and terrain involved, 
40Interview with Lieutenant Commander J. Forsha, MSC, 
USN, Office of the Surgeon General of the Navy, Medical 
Plans and Policy Branch, 26 July 1994. 
41Interview with Dr. P. Rehmus, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, 29 
July 1994. 
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rates aboard ships could be much different than those 
experienced by Marines in the field. 
Due to the differences in the nature of warfare 
encountered by the three services, wounded in action rates for 
the 733 study were based on service-specific methodologies. 
For the Navy, casualty rates were taken from the Navy 
Capabilities Mobilization Plan (NCMP) . This is an OPNAV 
instruction which specifies rates to be used for each type of 
Navy and Marine Corps unit. The NCMP is updated biannually 
with the Defense Planning Guidance.42 
3.  Structure-based Wartime Requirement 
While the MPM and other well-known planning tools 
determine the medical wartime requirement based on workload, 
a structure-based requirement exists as well. This would 
include all medical personnel organic to specific units needed 
during wartime or to sustain wartime units, including active 
duty and reserve personnel both in theater and in CONUS. Much 
of this involves Echelons One and Two care. Different 
categories of Navy inputs to structure-based requirements, 
followed by examples of each, are provided below: 
• Echelons I and II Casualty Care - medical personnel 
stationed on ships, with FMF combat units and in 
squadrons 
• CINC Staff - CINCPACFLT Fleet Medical Officer 
• Other Medical Units in Combat Zone - FMF Dental Units 
• Other Headquarters and Government Staff Support - 
Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) medical staff 
• Training Commands - Navy Training Center, Great Lakes 
42Interview with Lieutenant Commander J. Forsha, MSC, 
USN, Office of the Surgeon General of the Navy, Plans and 
Policy Branch, 2 September 1994. 
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• Other - medical personnel assigned to Military Entrance 
Processing Stations (MEPS) and Bureau of Naval 
Personnel (BUPERS) medical staff 
Many of these requirements are delineated in the Total 
Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS) , commonly known as 
the billet file. This is a mainframe database maintained by 
the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Force Programming 
and Manpower which contains all officer, enlisted, civilian, 
and contractor billets or jobs for which the Navy is 
authorized to spend money at any given time. TFMMS does not 
include billets to be filled by Marine Corps officers and 
enlisted personnel. However, since the medical community 
utilizes Navy manpower assets to meet Marine Corps health care 
needs, this structure does not necessarily limit or complicate 
use of the billet file for Navy Medicine. 
Organized primarily by command through a Unit 
Identification Code (UIC), TFMMS contains over 40 data 
elements for each job. A Naval Officer Billet Classification 
(NOBC) identifies the essential requirements and officer 
occupational qualifications acquired through billet experience 
or through a combination of education and experience. 
Examples for Navy Medicine include Neurosurgeon (0224), 
Executive Officer, Shore Activity (9436), Health Care 
Administrator (0800), and Critical Care Nurse (0904). For 
enlisted members, a similar code is used called a Navy 
Enlisted Classification (NEC). Examples of those found in 
TFMMS include X-ray Technician (8452) , Dental Equipment Repair 
Technician (8732), Mortician (8496), and Dental Administrative 
Technician (8703). 
In addition to UIC and NOBC or NEC, other elements 
typically include the designator, rank, and subspecialty 
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needed for the billet. Medical officer community designators 
include the following: 
• 2100 - Medical Corps (MC) 
• 2200 - Dental Corps (DC) 
• 2300 - Medical Service Corps (MSC) 
• 2900 - Nurse Corps (NC) 
Medical Corps officers include physicians ranging from 
general practitioners to highly trained specialists in fields 
such as thoracic or neurological surgery. Personnel with the 
Dental Corps designator are trained as dentists. Specialties 
range from comprehensive dentistry to oral maxillofacial 
surgery. 
The Medical Service Corps is composed of 32 specialties. 
Areas which are more administrative in nature include health 
care administration, comptrollership, supply, and medical 
logistics administration. Other specialists found in the MSC 
are microbiologists, optometrists, pharmacists, social 
workers, and psychologists. Finally, the Nurse Corps is 
composed of officers with training in nursing fields such as 
critical care, ambulatory care, quality assurance, newborn, 
and emergency/trauma. 
The enlisted community uses rate codes which identify 
broad enlisted career fields. Rate codes specific to the 
enlisted medical community are listed below: 
• 8000 - Hospital Corpsman (HM) 
• 8300 - Dental Technician (DT) 
A field is included in TFMMS to delineate whether a 
particular job is required only during peacetime, only in 
wartime, or both. Wartime requirements are further divided 
into those to be filled by active duty personnel, those which 
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should be accomplished with Reserve Immediate personnel (RI), 
or those filled by Reserve Delay (RD) personnel. 
The predominant distinction made between these categories 
is one of timing. Mobilization requirements are categorized 
using a maximum timeframe (in months) within which the billet 
must be filled. In TFMMS, these take the form of mobilization 
fields, beginning at month one (M+l) and ending with those 
billets which need to be filled within one year after the call 
for mobilization (M+12). Within Navy Medicine, active duty 
personnel usually fulfill any mobilization requirements for 
the first 30 days of a conflict, while reserve personnel are 
typically utilized for mobilization requirements which begin 
after that timeframe. During normal peacetime operations, 
those billets identified as peacetime requirements may be 90 
percent filled or less; however, jobs deemed to be necessary 
during war must be at 100 percent capacity.43 
Given the instrumental role TFMMS data plays in the 
manpower arena, it is important to determine how it is decided 
what billets and subspecialties are to be placed in the billet 
file. The answer for Navy Medicine depends upon the mission 
involved. Decisions involving manpower to support the 
peacetime benefit mission revolve around a process called 
Efficiency Review which in the past has stressed historical 
workload, size of beneficiary population, and other factors. 
The THCSRR model incorporates only those personnel required 
for medical readiness as the Navy defines it; therefore it can 
be argued that only those billets involved in the wartime 
operational mission are relevant in this discussion. 
This may be true in terms of examining the THCSRR model; 
however it is imperative to keep in mind the unique degree of 
Phone conversation with Mrs. D. Brascher, Assistant 
Chief of Naval Personnel, Manpower Requirements and 
Authorizations Division, 1 September 1994. 
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interaction between these two missions and how this effects 
force sizing. War itself is not a continuous state. Those 
personnel required for war will most certainly be used during 
peacetime to provide health care to the beneficiary- 
population. Any model or system which determines medical 
personnel for readiness will in some way determine forces 
needed during peacetime. 
Wartime billets are linked directly with platforms and 
units through the Required Operational Capability and 
Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) for the Navy and 
the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for the Marine 
Corps. These are classified documents which are validated 
every eighteen months to two years. They serve as basic 
guidelines for placement of all personnel on ships and in FMF 
activities, including medical manpower. Requirements for 
specific quantities and types of medical officers and enlisted 
personnel would be designated in the ROC/POE and TO&E for each 
type of platform. 
For example, Table 3.1 lists the number and type of 
medical personnel designated to serve on major surface ships 
in the Navy as of FY92. Information presented corresponds to 
personnel requirements per ship. Columns are organized by 
designator, with additional distinctions made for Physician 
Assistant (PA) and Independent Duty Technician (IDT). These 
numbers represent personnel organic to the platforms listed 
and who therefore fall into the structure-based requirement 
category. Some of these platforms will receive additional 
medical personnel during mobilization for war. This is 
especially true of the Casualty Receiving and Treatments Ships 
(CRTS) which are marked with an asterisk in Table 3. Wartime 
augments are reflected as additions in the mobilization fields 
of TFMMS. 
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SHIP MC PA DC MSC NC IDT HM DT TOTAL 
AD 1 1 4 2 17 10 35 
AE 1 1 1 2 5 
AFS 1 1 4 6 
AGF 1 1 6 2 10 
AO 1 1 1 3 
AOE 1 1 5 2 9 
AOR 1 4 5 
ARS 1 1 2 
AS 2 3 2 16 10 33 
ASR 1 1 1 3 
ATS 1 1 2 
CG 1 2 3 
CGN 1 1 4 6 
CV 2 1 5 2 1 1 28 12 52 
CVN 2 1 5 2 1 1 28 12 52 
DD 1 1 2 
DDG 1 1 2 
FF 1 1 2 
FFG 1 1 2 
LCC 1 1 13 3 18 
LHA 1 1 1 1 15 3 22 
LHD 2 1 1 1 17 4 26 
LKA 1 6 7 
LPD 1 1 6 3 11 
LPH 1 1 2 9 2 15 
LSD 1 1 4 3 9 
T.RT 
. 1  1 2 * 
Table 3.1:  Shipboard Medical Requirements44 
Department of the Navy, Total Force Manpower 
Management System database, FY92. 
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The combination of workload-based and structure-based 
medical wartime requirements constitutes the total wartime 
requirement component of the THCSRR model. It is worth noting 
that the results of the 733 Study were organized by designator 
for purposes of simplicity. To structure the THCSRR model at 
the more detailed NOBC/NEC and subspecialty levels, the task 
force relied on supporting documentation used in the 
calculation of Navy-specific 733 Study inputs. Information 
contained in the ROC/POE and TO&E was also used to determine 
requirements at the primary subspecialty level. 
C.  DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL COMPONENT 
The second component of the THCSRR is termed the day-to- 
day operational segment and has as its foundation a study 
completed in 1994 by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) . The 
basic premise of this portion of the model is that there are 
certain billets and locations in the Navy medical community 
which must be filled in order for the Navy to perform its 
mission on a daily basis. The day-to-day operational portion 
of the THCSRR defines these types of billets in one of two 
categories: the Peacetime Operational Force (POF) or the 
CONUS rotation base (RB) needed to support the POF. 
1.  The Peacetime Operational Force 
According to the model, the three elements of the POF 
include Fleet and Fleet Marine Force billets, billets out of 
the continental United States (OCONUS), and those which are 
located in isolated sites within the United States (ICONUS). 
Fleet and FMF billets are similar to those organic billets 
discussed in the previous section; however, POF billets only 
include those which are required during peacetime. Medical 
personnel normally stationed on ships, with Marine Corps 
units, or in squadrons all constitute examples of POF billets. 
The OCONUS category includes all billets in medical and 
dental facilities overseas, in Alaska, and in Hawaii.  The 
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underlying assumption in this case rests with the belief that 
active duty and dependents should not be forced to rely on 
medical treatment from host nation physicians. 
The final genre of POF billets are those associated with 
ICONUS locations, specifically the Naval hospital at 
Twenty-Nine Palms Marine Corps base and the Naval hospital and 
dental clinic at Lemoore Naval Air Station. These are labeled 
medically isolated based on the notion that alternative care 
providers would be difficult and expensive to acquire. 
To determine the POF, the model focuses on personnel 
authorized in the billet file and not on actual medical 
personnel inventory. BUMED databases called "body files" are 
designed to track information on actual medical personnel and 
their subspecialties. One of the rudimentary assumptions is 
that every medical billet in TFMMS actually constitutes a 
requirement. If this principle assumption is applied, much of 
the labor involved in determining the Day-to-Day component of 
the model lies in identifying and categorizing Peacetime 
Operational Forces in the billet file. The methodology used 
in the CNA study centered around information existing in the 
1993 billet file; however, the wartime component was 
calculated for the 1999 timeframe. The task force corrected 
for this inconsistency by using the 1999 column of TFMMS and 
then deleting platforms and billets which were programmed to 
be eliminated but had not yet shown up as losses. 
Creation of the POF was primarily accomplished by 
utilizing existing fields in TFMMS. Of particular 
significance was the use of Type Assignment Codes (TAC) for 
officers and the Seashore Codes for enlisted. Both of these 
fields delineate the nature of a particular activity or billet 
(e.g., overseas, on sea duty, or shore duty). Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 provide descriptions of the different TACs and Seashore 
Codes used in the billet file as of 1993. 
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TAC LOCATION DESCRIPTION CATEGORY 
A Alaska OCONUS 
C Sea duty- Fleet 
D Ship or squadron Fleet 
G Nonmilitary U.S. Fleet 
H Hawaii OCONUS 
0 Outside CONUS OCONUS 
S Shore duty Shore 
Table 3.2:  Type Assignment Codes in TFMMS45 
SEASHORE T.OCATTON DESCRIPTION CATEGORY 
1 Shore duty Shore 
2 Sea duty Fleet 
3 Overseas shore duty OCONUS 
4 Nonrotated sea duty Fleet 
5 Neutral duty Shore 
6 Preferred overseas 
shore duty 
OCONUS 
8 Double sea duty Fleet 
Table 3.3:  Seashore Codes in TFMMS46 
45, 
'Center for Naval Analysis, Measuring the Impact of 
the Navy's Downsizing on Medical Officer Billets, CRM 93- 
217, March 1994, p. 12. 
46, 
'Center for Naval Analysis, Measuring the Medical 
Enlisted Rotation Base and the Impact of Force Downsizing, 
CRM 94-43, April 1994, p. 12. 
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There is an assortment of billets which are not included 
in the POF. The most obvious are those involving shore duty 
in CONUS. These include all CONUS Navy MTFs and DTFs, 
clinics, headquarters commands, training billets, research and 
development commands, and any other medical shore support 
billets. Also eliminated from the POF are any billets with a 
primary NOBC of 0000, representing the Transients, Patients, 
Prisoners, and Holding (TPP&H) category. This category of 
TFMMS billets allows for the fact that at any given time a 
certain percentage of Navy personnel are being treated in a 
hospital, are in the process of moving to a new duty station, 
are on administrative or legal hold, or are in prison. 
2.  Rotation Base 
The second element of the Day-to-Day component of the 
THCSRR model is a rotation base (RB) for the POF. 
Conceptually, a rotation base provides a pool of skilled and 
trained active duty medical personnel from which to draw upon 
to relieve POF billets. Rationale for creating this group is 
based on the elemental principle that active duty personnel 
should remain mobile and therefore are not permanently 
assigned to an activity. The additional hardships placed on 
personnel and their families as a result of being stationed in 
POF billets such as overseas, aboard a ship, or with the FMF 
highlight this idea. Concepts such as promotion and retention 
rates as well as training factors were not considered in this 
portion of the model. Within this context, the rotation base 
represents a minimum billet requirement excluding elements 
needed to make a rotation policy executable.47 
The methodology employed for calculating a notional 
officer and enlisted rotation base focuses on the ratio of 
47Measuring the Impact of the Navy's Downsizing on 
Medical Officer Billets, op. cit., p. 22. 
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shore tour length to POF billet tour length. This ratio 
produces what is termed the RB multiplier. If the shore to 
sea ratio for a particular medical specialty is 36:12 (in 
months) with a corresponding RB multiplier of three, the Navy- 
would require three CONUS billets to support each sea billet. 
The premise is that in each of the next three years, the Navy 
would be expected to replace one of the sea billets with one 
person currently ashore. 
Factors which help determine the size of the multiplier 
include information on medical subspecialty, location of duty 
station, and Navy policy guidelines on tour length. Although 
the conceptual framework behind the RB multiplier is similar 
for officers and enlisted, significant differences in 
assumptions will be outlined. 
a. Sea-Shore Rotation Assumptions 
Naval officers are typically assigned to shore tours 
for 3 6 months and fleet tours for 24 months, resulting in a 
shore to sea tour ratio of 36:24, or 1.5. This 1.5 ratio is 
used in the model as a multiplier for each medical officer POF 
billet in TFMMS which shares this sea-shore rotation policy to 
create a rotation base. There are many deviations from this 
general case depending on which NOBCs or subspecialties are 
involved. Medical and surgical specialty officers may serve 
at some sites for only 24 months, while medical service corps 
and nurse corps officers may be required to remain for a full 
3 6 months. Another exception involves the abbreviated 12 
month fleet tour for surgeons serving on aircraft carriers. 
In'this case, the shore to sea ratio would be 36:12 and the RB 
multiplier would be three vice 1.5. 
The nature of enlisted career paths fostered 
somewhat different methods of calculating the enlisted RB for 
the THCSRR. Due to educational requirements to learn the 
fundamentals of the Hospital Corpsman (HM) and Dental 
Technician (DT) ratings, sea-shore rotation rules usually 
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apply only to those personnel beyond their first reenlistment. 
In addition, all DTs and only those HMs with NECs are eligible 
for sea assignments directly following their school training. 
For these groups the model assumes that a rotation base is 
needed only for those billets with a paygrade of E-5 or above, 
as this is the typical rank upon graduation.48 The overall 
enlisted rotation policy also differs from that of officers. 
Most NECs now have a rotation policy of INUS for one tour 
followed by one tour OUTUS. Although no translation exists 
for these acronyms, they correspond to particular types of 
duty. OUTUS duty is usually not less than 36 months and 
includes sea-shore codes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. INUS duty, on 
the other hand, is 48 months long and consists of code 1 
activities including Hawaii and Alaska. 
b.     OCOMJS Rotation Assumptions 
OCONUS billets are unique in the fact that, in most 
cases, tour length is a function of whether the service member 
is accompanied by dependents. Accompanied OCONUS tours are 
traditionally 3 6 months long while unaccompanied tours are 
shortened to 24 months, producing RB ratios and multipliers of 
36:36 (1) and 36:24 (1.5), respectively. Calculation of a 
notional rotation base for OCONUS POF billets thus requires an 
assumption concerning the average number of accompanied and 
unaccompanied tours. 
The THCSRR model conjectured an accompanied tour 
weight of 75 percent for officers and 25 percent for enlisted. 
The presumption in this case is that more officers on average 
bring families with them to overseas assignments. As in the 
fleet tours, there are exceptions to the generic cases of 36 
or 24 month overseas tours. OCONUS tour lengths can vary 
between 12 to 30 months, depending on the location and medical 
48Measuring the Medical Enlisted Rotation Base and the 
Impact of Force Downsizing, op. cit., p. 17. 
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subspecialty involved. Both the Officer and Enlisted Transfer 
Manuals were consulted and exceptions were taken into account 
whenever possible. 
D.  THE MEDICAL OPERATIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENT COMPONENT 
After close examination of the wartime and day-to-day- 
operational components, it becomes clear that certain billets 
are inherent in both. This characteristic prohibits the 
simple addition of the two sets of readiness requirements 
because those billets would in effect be counted twice. This 
logic serves as the impetus for the third component of the 
model called the Medical Operational Support Requirement or 
MOSR. The MOSR filters out those redundancies yet maintains 
unique billets by taking the union of the wartime and day-to- 
day components. This is accomplished by examining the numbers 
generated by the two components for a particular NOBC/NEC or 
subspecialty and taking the higher of the two. Table 3.4 
illustrates this concept using a random assortment of medical 
officer and enlisted specialties. Information contained in the 
table was extracted from a printout of the THCSRR database and 
reflects the most current version as of July 1994. The DTD 
column represents day-to-day operational requirements, 
including rotation base, according to the CNA study. The WAR 
column lists the Wartime Requirements component defined in the 
733 Study. 
The model lists anywhere from nine to nearly fifty NOBCs 
or NECs for any particular medical officer designator or 
enlisted rate. If an NOBC was administrative in nature, such 
as Executive Officer, the task force changed the NOBC to match 
the subspecialty listed in TFMMS. In addition, some 
subspecialty codes were combined for simplification purposes. 
After individual NOBC/NEC or subspecialty figures are 
computed, total MOSR numbers for each officer designator and 
enlisted rate are generated. For example, MOSR components for 
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all 42 NOBCs in the Medical Corps, which would include the two 
cases provided in Table 3.4, are added to form one overall 
Medical Corps MOSR number. The MOSR component of the THCSRR 
model represents the minimum number of fully trained active 
duty personnel, by corps, required to accomplish both the 
wartime and day-to-day missions of Navy Medicine. 
NOBC/NEC DESCRIPTION (corps) DTD WAR MOSR 
8432 Preventative Medi- 
cine Technician (HM) 
723 513 723 
8752 Basic Dental Lab 
Technician (DT) 
85 152 152 
0115 Psychiatrist (MC) 5 2 5 
0214 General Surgeon (MC) 138 230 230 
0113 Physicians Assistant 
(MSC) 
140 190 190 
0935 Ambulatory Care 
Nurse Professional 
(NC) 
108 36 108 
0560 Periodontist (DC) 44 18 44 
Table 3.4:  Sample MOSR Calculation by NOBC/NEC 
E.  SUSTAINMENT COMPONENT 
The fourth and final portion of the model involves a 
sustainment piece designed to allow for a continuous flow of 
qualified personnel into MOSR specified jobs as personnel 
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attrite.49 Losses are attributed either to members deciding 
to leave the Navy or moving to a higher skill level and thus 
leaving a particular NOBC/NEC. 
According to the model, sustainment is composed of four 
elements: loss rates, training billets, mission continuity, 
and Transients, Patients, Prisoners, and Holding (TPP&H). 
This section will outline the basic assumptions and the 
underlying principles behind each of these elements as they 
relate to the THCSRR model. 
1. Annual Loss Rates 
Deriving the sustainment component involves the 
assessment and application of attrition rates for each 
specialty. These rates are used to determine the number of 
medical personnel which must be recruited into the system to 
replace losses. Computations entail taking a weighted average 
of the loss rates by specialty for the previous five years. 
Due to data irregularities, the year in which Operation Desert 
Storm occurred was not included in loss rate calculations. In 
addition, fluctuations in initiatives such as Selective 
Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) plus unavailability of attrition 
rate data for years other than 1993 limited these calculations 
for many of the NECs. To illustrate this methodology, if the 
attrition rate for Preventative Medicine Technicians listed in 
Table 3.4 is computed at nine percent, then the sustainment 
piece to resupply that subspecialty would be approximately 65 
personnel (723 X 9% = 65) . 
2. Training and Graduate Medical Education 
Some of the communities within Navy Medicine directly 
recruit personnel who either already possess the necessary 
skills and training or acquire them in a fairly short 
49Lieutenant T.H. Weber, MSC, USN, The THCSRR Model: 
Determining Navy Medicine's Readiness Manpower Requirements, 
Navy Medicine (Draft), 1994, p. 6. 
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timeframe. However, additional sustainment elements are 
considered for certain specialties because of the complicated 
and lengthy nature of their training. Medical and Dental 
Corps officers are unique in that they require several years 
of training in general and then in specialty areas in order to 
perform as certified physicians. 
A basic understanding of a typical training pipeline 
through residency is beneficial when discussing the 
sustainment component for these medical officers. Under the 
current system, Medical Corps personnel can be trained using 
either the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program 
(AFHPSP) or Navy Active Duty Deferred Scholarships (NADDS). 
The latter involves the complete training of a specialist 
using civilian programs and is therefore not considered for 
the purposes of the THCSRR model. 
The AFHPSP, on the other hand, involves a rather 
complicated network of "in-house" military medical training in 
what is called the Graduate Medical Education (GME) program. 
GME begins with an internship program in one of three Navy 
training hospitals, followed by either immediate entry into a 
residency program or a tour with the Fleet or FMF as a General 
Medical Officer (GMO), Flight Surgeon, or Undersea Medical 
Officer (UMO). Before being deployed with such units, these 
personnel require additional, military-specific training which 
the sustainment piece takes into account. Upon completion of 
these tours, personnel either get out of the service or 
advance to more sophisticated training in a residency program 
within the Navy or through the Full Time Out Service (FTOS) 
program in the civilian sector. 
Several conceptual principles regarding internship and 
GME residency training impact computation of the sustainment 
portion of the model. The first is that complete reliance on 
the alternative (e.g., civilian resources) for the Medical 
Corps would not provide the quality, specialty mix, or numbers 
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prescribed by the MOSR. This stems from the practice of 
utilizing GMOs in Fleet and FMF billets after 12 month 
internships. Navy Medicine maintains that the GMO is critical 
to the casualty care and flow expectations of Echelons I and 
II. The Navy deploys these officers in isolated environments 
without the assistance of other specialists or experienced 
medical officers. 
For this reason, Navy GME currently consists of a well 
rounded internship program which incorporates medicine, 
surgery, critical care, emergency care, OB/GYN, and ambulatory 
care. This is in contrast to most civilian training programs 
which have instituted a more categorical internship focusing 
on a single medical specialty with the expectation an intern 
will continue education in that area. This has led to the 
philosophy that civilian interns are not adequately trained to 
meet Navy operational GMO billets. By the same token, 
civilian residents who have been fully trained in a medical 
specialty may be over-qualified for these billets and could 
encounter skills erosion if placed there. 
In either case, the premise is that personnel trained by 
the civilian sector lack the military-specific training 
gleaned from an in-house GME program. If this rationale is 
accepted, the current method of "growing" Navy physicians is 
essential to sustainment of the MOSR and GME billets should be 
considered. 
The second issue centers around the accreditation process 
and its impact on the training portion of sustainment. To 
recruit and retain the physicians necessary for the MOSR, the 
Navy internship and GME residency training programs must be 
competitive with their civilian counterparts. Nationally 
recognized credit for internship requires training programs 
that are accredited by the Residency Review Committee (RRC) of 
the American Council for GME (ACGME). This civilian 
institution specifies guidelines for the number of training 
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years for each program, the volume and age of patients each 
trainee must encounter during training, and the minimum number 
of students who can be in a program in a given year. 
In addition to these factors, accreditation of most GME 
residency programs depends on the presence of other associated 
accredited residency programs. For example, an Otolaryngology 
(commonly known as ears/nose/throat or ENT) residency program 
would not be accredited without the existence of surgery, 
orthopedic, pediatric, and internal medicine programs as 
well.50 The THCSRR model incorporates these accreditation 
requirements into the sustainment piece by allowing for intern 
and resident billets to support the MOSR. 
3. Mission Continuity Element 
The Mission Continuity Element (MCE) is the third 
component of the sustainment piece. It defines a small number 
of staff specialty billets which provide the appropriate 
stability, senior credibility and experience for the rotation 
base. For physicians, it also allows for the number and 
specialties of teaching and research staff dictated by ACGME 
training requirements. Because the American Dental 
Association requires incumbent residents to maintain 
accreditation with a minimum of one resident per year, certain 
Dental Corps billets are added to the MCE. Certain Health 
Care Science (HCS) Medical Service Corps officer 
subspecialties are also included in the MCE due to inability 
to find comparable specialists in the civilian sector. 
4. Transients, Patients, Prisoners, and Holding 
This category of billets in TFMMS was defined earlier in 
the chapter as those personnel who are either being treated in 
the hospital,  in the process of moving,  on legal or 
50Phone conversation with Ms. L. Agular, General 
Medical Education Office, Oakland Naval Hospital, 8 
September 1994. 
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administrative hold, or in prison. The Navy Bureau of 
Personnel (BUPERS) determines, based on historical data, how 
many billets generally fall into this category at any given 
time. Although the model did not include TPP&H billets in 
rotation base calculations, they are added as part of the 
sustainment piece. 
F.  THE THCSRR 
The sustainment portion of the model is simply added to 
the MOSR component, by specialty, to attain the Total Health 
Care Support Readiness Requirement for Navy Medicine. The 
THCSRR was designed to represent the minimum number of active 
duty medical personnel which should be programmed for in order 
to achieve Navy medical readiness. Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
various components of the THCSRR model, including the 
principles and policies behind each. 
This model incorporates a broad spectrum of ideals. The 
complicated arena of medical wartime planning introduces 
factors such as WIA and DNBI rates, echelons of care, and 
medical support elements. The day-to-day portion utilizes the 
billet file in combination with existing rotation and tour 
length policies to estimate daily operational requirements and 
a supporting rotation base. After these two elements are 
joined and redundancies are eliminated, a sustainment tail is 
added. This is designed to resupply losses and maintain a 
training structure to ensure continuity, sustained skill 
level, and compliance with civilian accreditation guidelines. 
The assumptions, generalizations, and underlying principles 
outlined in this chapter affect the outcomes of the model and 
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IV.  MODEL DRIVERS AND TRADEOFF IMPLICATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The actual composition of the THCSRR model described in 
the previous chapter furnishes valuable information on the 
policies, practices, and priorities which currently govern the 
force structure of the Navy medical community. The model's 
underlying principles provide a framework with which to view 
the Navy's definition of medical readiness manpower 
requirements. In this chapter, the model's role as an 
analytical tool will be examined, including a discussion of 
the possibilities it may introduce for those making critical 
decisions about the future size and structure of Navy 
Medicine. These are decisions which entail serious financial 
and political repercussions, not to mention possible effects 
on the methods of providing health care to a large beneficiary 
population. 
Results of the THCSRR can serve as a magnifying glass, 
helping to reveal which missions, assumptions and policies are 
driving medical endstrength levels and thus personnel costs. 
In addition, the model provides a starting point for future 
analysis of methods of supporting the peacetime benefit 
mission in a cost effective manner. Using the model for these 
purposes may enable Navy leadership to make more informed 
policy and force structure decisions based on focused cost 
benefit analysis. 
It is not the intent of this study to actually perform 
cost benefit analysis using the THCSRR model. Not only could 
that subject constitute grounds for a thesis in itself, it 
would also require more precise data than is currently 
available from the model. All numbers generated from database 
printouts to date have been labeled "notional" in nature. This 
chapter illustrates how a financial manager might capitalize 
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on such a model to initiate cost benefit analysis and consider 
tradeoff possibilities. 
Analysis in this chapter relies on notional results of 
the THCSRR model as of the end of July 1994. A complete 
database of MOSR calculations by NOBC/NEC is provided in 
Appendix A. All tables in this chapter are excerpts from that 
appendix. Unless otherwise indicated, day-to-day and wartime 
requirements will be labeled DTD and WAR in all tables and 
figures. 
The initial sections of this chapter will delve into 
overall results of the model and their implications at the 
macro level. This analysis will also provide a broad 
perspective on the relative sizes of Navy medical endstrength 
requirements by designator and mission. Distinctions will 
then be made between MOSR billets dominated by the day-to-day 
operational mission and those driven by the wartime mission. 
Subsequent sections will outline factors driving each 
component of the model and provide examples of specialties 
which are affected solely by those components. The final 
section of this chapter illustrates tradeoff possibilities 
which the model may allow for and analyzes those which the 
model does not address. 
B.  OVERVIEW OF THCSRR RESULTS 
A general overview of the results obtained from this 
model provides a glimpse at the total quantity of personnel 
required in each medical community. Table 4.1 shows Total 
Health Care Support Readiness Requirement by Corps for fiscal 
year 1999. Also included are endstrength levels which have 
been programmed for the same time period. As explained in 
Chapter III, the MOSR is calculated by taking the union of the 
wartime and day-to-day operational requirements. THCSRR 
numbers are generated by adding a Sustainment component to the 
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MOSR.  Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of the THCSRR 
illustrating percentage contributions from each Corps. 
CORPS 
1 






1695 2105 2340 1377 3717 4109 
Dental 
Corps 




1411 1790 2119 409 2528 2685 
Nurse 
Corps 
1338 2385 2698 293 2991 3243 
Hosp. 
Corpsman 




1640 2734 2854 196 3050 3125 
TOTALS 20986 33738 36257 3875 40132 40205 
Table 4.1:  THCSRR Results by Corps For FY9951 
The principle benefit of examining the model in this form 
is that it affords the opportunity to compare results with 
programmed endstrength levels by Corps. The THCSRR is 
designed to identify manpower readiness requirements; 
personnel in excess of model numbers would be used solely for 
the peacetime benefit mission in CONUS. 
51* LNotional THCSRR data supplied by the Office of the 
Surgeon General of the Navy, Medical Plans and Policy 





















































The following list provides a breakdown of the number of 
billets which are in excess of the THCSRR: 
• Medical Corps - 392 
• Dental Corps - 87 
• Medical Service Corps - 157 
• Nurse Corps - 252 
• Dental Technician - 75 
With the current emphasis on rightsizing all aspects of the 
military, this information would prove instrumental in 
assessing possible alternatives to providing cost effective 
health care. This idea will be examined in greater detail in 
the final section of this chapter. 
C.  DISSECTING THE MOSR COMPONENT 
Due to the nature of the union mechanism used in 
calculating the MOSR component, overall MOSR results by- 
designator contain an undistinguishable mixture of billets 
required for each mission. Examining the model at this broad 
level may be misleading in some respects. For instance, 
results in Table 4.1 could lead one to infer that Dental Corps 
manpower requirements are the only billets to be influenced 
primarily by the Day-to-Day Operational component of the 
model. This might in turn lead a decisionmaker to believe 
that options are limited because almost all medical 
requirements stem from the wartime mission. 
Why is it important to make these distinctions? The 
answer is a simple one based on a common sense approach to 
resource management. It is extremely difficult to make 
effective financial and policy decisions, conduct cost benefit 
analysis, or examine tradeoff possibilities without knowing 
the precise source of requirements and costs. 
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Examining the MOSR by NOBC/NEC and subspecialty rather 
than by Corps reveals which types of billets are influenced by 
the different model components. It is possible, therefore, to 
compute the percentage of each Corps in which the medical 
specialties have a day-to-day requirement exceeding those of 
the wartime requirement. Using information in Appendix A, 
Wartime and Day-to-Day components were analyzed at this more 
detailed level. The following are percentages of each Navy 
medical community's MOSR billets which are influenced 
primarily by the day-to-day operational requirement: 
• Medical Corps - 25% 
• Dental Corps - 98.9% 
• Medical Service Corps - 31% 
• Nurse Corps - 18.6% 
• Hospital Corpsman - 6.1% 
• Dental Technician - 31% 
These statistics do not describe the percentage of MOSR 
billets required purely for the day-to-day mission. Rather, 
they reflect the percentage of billets in which the Day-to-Day 
component is greater than the Wartime component. For example, 
18 of the 42 Medical Corps NOBCs had day-to-day requirements 
which exceeded wartime requirements. These 18 NOBCs had a 
combined MOSR requirement of 586 billets. This constitutes 25 
percent of the total MOSR requirement for the Medical Corps. 
As expected, the Dental Corps requirements are influenced 
almost exclusively by the Day-to-Day component. In addition, 
substantial portions of both MSC, DT, and MC billets stem from 
this requirement as well. Examples of these types of 
specialties for the MSC include Comptroller, General Supply 
Officer, Administrative Officer, and Food Service Medical 
Facility Officer. Medical Corps billets driven by the day-to- 
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day mission include Pediatricians, Family Practitioners, Child 
Psychiatrists, and Obstetricians/Gynecologists. Examples of 
enlisted billets in the dental community which fall into this 
category are Dental Administrative Technician, Dental 
Equipment Repair Technician, and Field Service Dental 
Technician. 
The remaining MOSR billets are influenced predominantly 
by wartime requirements. Hospital Corpsman billets constitute 
the largest percentage, including Surgical Technologists, 
Basic Laboratory Technicians, and Advanced X-Ray Technicians. 
Examples of Nurse Corps billets falling into this category are 
Nurse Anesthetist, Staff Nurse (Professional Nurse 
subspecialty), and Critical Care Nurse. 
This process of identifying the subspecialties influenced 
by each of these two components is important within the 
context of analyzing this model. Tradeoffs and force sizing 
decisions are made at the subspecialty level in most cases, 
therefore it is extremely beneficial to identify which 
specialties are influenced by particular requirements. 
This analysis also helps answer questions regarding what 
percentage of the current force is devoted to wartime 
requirements, day-to-day operations, sustainment, and 
peacetime benefit. Figure 4.2 breaks down FY99 programmed 
endstrength into these categories. An additional category 
labeled "Both DTD & War" was created for those billets which 
are required for both wartime and day-to-day operational 
missions. 
The next sections examine factors driving the wartime and 
day-to-day requirements themselves; however, this analysis 
will be of marginal use if one does not understand which 
billets and subspecialties are affected by each mission. For 
instance, changes in factors driving the wartime requirement 
would produce only slight changes in a subspecialty influenced 

































D.  DRIVERS OF THE WARTIME COMPONENT 
The wartime requirements of the model are driven 
primarily by the Illustrative Planning Scenarios and the 
guidelines established by the DPG. These lay the foundation 
upon which all DoD wartime requirements are based. For the 
medical community, this involves factors which transform 
battle scenarios and casualty rates into demand for medical 
care performed by a certain quantity and specialty mix of 
medical personnel. The THCSRR model assumes these factors are 
fixed. 
Rather than focusing on the macro policy decisions and 
fixed assumptions of these planning tools, it may be more 
beneficial to highlight some of the input parameters which 
significantly drive the readiness model. These include the 
Wounded in Action (WIA) and Disease Non Battle Injury (DNBI) 
rates as well as the overall theater evacuation policy. This 
section will not only discuss these elements and their effects 
on manpower readiness requirements, but will also provide some 
insight into medical officer NOBCs and enlisted NECs driven 
solely by wartime requirements according to the THCSRR model. 
As discussed in Chapter III, WIA and DNBI rates are based 
largely on historical and subjective assessments. Changing 
threats, the increasing importance of peacekeeping operations, 
and uncertainty surrounding the nature of future combat 
intensities may lead to an overall decrease in the WIA rates 
used for planning purposes. Technological innovations which 
increase the survivability of our weapons platforms will also 
lower and change the distribution and types of casualties. 
DNBI rates will vary by theater due to climate, weather, 
endemic diseases, and the nature of operations.52  Medical 
52Hix, W.M., and Hosek, S., Elements of Change in 
Military Medical Force Structure:  A White Paper, RAND Note 
N-3272-FMP/RA/PA&E, January 1992, p. 10. 
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advances in the prevention and treatment of disease as well as 
health and sanitation training for combat forces will change 
these rates over time. If recent conflicts are any indication 
of future trends, DNBI casualties will drive an increasing 
proportion of the demand for combat medical care as compared 
to WIA casualties. Nonetheless, lower rates in both these 
areas would drive smaller wartime component requirements for 
many of the medical specialties in the Navy THCSRR. 
Evacuation policy is yet another parameter which heavily 
influences medical wartime requirements.  This involves a 
determination as to which patients are to be evacuated based 
on estimates of the total length of time they are expected to 
be hospitalized.  Unlike casualty rates which are determined 
largely by the mission and probable wartime scenarios, 
evacuation policy is set by planners and therefore offers wide 
latitude as to the relative proportions of treatment provided 
in the theater of operations and CONUS.   Transportation 
technology has shortened feasible evacuation times. Policies 
were generally kept at 150 days during World War I and were 
lowered to 60 days during World War II.  Recent guidance has 
directed the services to support a 15-day theater evacuation 
policy during peak demand.53  Shorter evacuation policies 
would lead to a decrease in the number of medical personnel 
required in theater. 
By examining the notional numbers generated by the MOSR, 
it becomes clear which officer NOBCs and enlisted NECs are 
only required during wartime. Table 4.2 provides a list of 
these billets and a brief description of each. 
This information provides a baseline against which to 
measure actual composition of the current Navy medical 
establishment.    For  instance,  the  model  indicates  a 
53FY99-01 DHP Program Objective Memorandum Preparation 
Instructions, op. cit., p. 4. 
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requirement for two Plastic Surgeons (plus the associated 
sustainment tail) to be utilized during wartime only. Any 
Plastic Surgeons currently in the system over and above that 
number would be in excess of readiness requirements and would 
therefore be open to cost benefit analysis. Many of the 
Medical Corps subspecialties falling in this category are 
extremely training intensive and therefore have larger 
sustainment requirements. This provides even more incentive 
to ensure they are being utilized in a cost effective way. 
NOBC/NEC CORPS        DESCRIPTION DTD WAR MOSR 
8705 DT Dental Hygienist Tech. 0 5 5 
8765 DT Dental Lab Technician, 
Maxillofacial 
0 2 2 
0169 MC Preventative Medicine, 
Public Health 
0 1 1 
0224 MC Neurosurgeon 0 21 21 
0254 MC Plastic Surgeon 0 2 2 
0264 MC Thoracic & Cardio- 
vascular Surgeon 
0 13 13 
0580 DC Oral Pathologist 0 2 2 
0822 MSC Medical Facility 
Liaison 
Officer 
0 1 1 
0854 MSC Research Psychologist 0 13 13 
TOTAL 60 
Table 4.2:  Billets Required Exclusively During Wartime 
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E.  DRIVERS OF THE DAY-TO-DAY COMPONENT 
One of the most influential factors in the Day-to-Day 
component is the rotation base for the peacetime operational 
forces (POF). Recall from the previous chapter that a 
rotation base is designed to provide a pool of skilled and 
trained active duty medical personnel to relieve those serving 
overseas, with the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, and in ICONUS 
duty stations. While awaiting assignment to POF billets, 
these personnel serve in CONUS hospitals and clinics providing 
health care services to active duty members and the 
beneficiary population. This illustrates an example of the 
unique relationship and interdependency between the different 
missions of Navy Medicine. 
Rotation base numbers are essentially driven by Navy 
personnel rotation and tour length policies. Although these 
are fairly standard for most Navy line communities, medical 
personnel often serve in Fleet and OCONUS tours for shorter 
durations. These billets with shorter tours require a larger 
pool of CONUS billets to relieve them and thus drive up the 
day-to-day operational requirement. 
Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3 illustrate the size of the 
rotation base relative to the total day-to-day requirement by 
designator and rate. The Dental Corps RB encompasses nearly 
60 percent of the day-to-day component for that community, 
followed closely by the Medical Service Corps and Nurse Corps 
with 56.5 and 55 percent respectively. When all medical 
communities are combined, over 40 percent of the day-to-day 
operational requirement is composed of CONUS rotation base 
billets. 
Just as with the Wartime component, there are billets 
which the model categorizes as being required only during day- 
to-day operations. These billets sum to over 540. Tables 4.4 
through 4.8 provide a detailed breakdown by Corps of those 
billets which the model labels as strictly day-to-day 
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Total Day-to-Day D Rot. Base 
Figure 4.3:  Graphical Representation of Rotation Base by Corps 
CORPS 










Medical Corps 45.7 




Nurse Corps 55.7 




Table 4.3:  Rotation Base as a Percentage of Day-to-Day Requirement 
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operational requirements. Officer subspecialties are provided 




DESCRIPTION DTD WAR MOSR 
0005 (1910) Dir, Health Service or 
Program (Med/Surg. Nursing) 
2 0 2 
0005 (1940) see above (Ambulatory Care 
Nursing) 
2 0 2 
0020 (1901) Health Service Dept. Head 
(Admin) 
5 0 5 
0028 (1945) Health Service Div. Officer 
(Emergency/Trauma Nursing) 
2 0 2 
0944 (1923) Staff Nurse (Newborns) 2 0 2 
TOTAL 13 0 13 
  
Table 4.4:  NC Billets Required Exclusively For Day-to-Day 
NOBC/NEC 
(subspec) 
DESCRIPTION DTD WAR MOSR 
8783 Dental Surgical Technician 13 0 13 
8427 FMF Recon. Corpsman 99 0 99 
8467 Occupational Therapy Asst. 14 0 14 
8491 Special Ops. Independent 
Duty Corpsman 
203 0 203 
TOTAL 329 0 329 





DESCRIPTION DTD WAR MOSR 
0030 Health Science Research 2 0 2 
00XX(1802) Medical  Logistics Admin 2 0 2 
00XX(1805) Plans,   Ops,   & Medical  Intel 2 0 2 
0800(1801) HCA   (Patient Admin.) 7 0 7 
0801(1800) Admin.  Off,  Dental  Service 2 0 2 
0841(1819) Microbio.   (Parasitology) 2 0 2 
0841(1821) see above   (Virology) 2 0 2 
1005(1802) Accounting   (Med Log.  Admin) 2 0 2 
TOTAL 21 0 21 
Table 4.6:  MSC Billets Required Exclusively For Day-to-Day 
NOBC/NEC 
(subspec) 
DESCRIPTION DTD WAR MOSR 
0335(1725) Dental Off.  Gen.   Practice 
(Comprehensive Dentistry) 
76 0 76 
0340(1745) Operative Dentist   (Oral 
Medicine/Diagnosis) 
3 0 3 
0525(1700) Compreh.  Dent   (Gen.   Dent) 22 0 22 
0550(1700) Oral Maxillofacial  Surgeon 
(General Dentistry) 
7 0 7 
0550(1760) see  above   (Periodontics) 3 0 3 
0569(1700) Prosthodontist   (Gen.  Dent) 15 0 15 
TOTAL 126 0 126 




DESCRIPTION DTD WAR MOSR 
0030 Health Science Research 3 0 3 
0031 Plans, Ops, & Medical 
Intelligence 
3 0 3 
0101 (1641) Internist (Infect. Disease) 17 0 17 
0102 (1602) General Practice Medical 
Officer (Flight Surgeon) 
3 0 3 
0108 (1600) Family Practitioner 
(General Medical Officer) 
12 0 12 
0108(1601) Family Pract (FMF Medicine) 5 0 5 
0108(1602) see above (Family 
Practitioner) 
3 0 3 
0110(1605) Fit. Surgeon (Undersea Med) 1 0 1 
0160 Preventative Medicine 5 0 5 
TOTAL 52 0 52 
Table 4.8:  MC Billets Required Exclusively For Day-to-Day 
F.  TRADEOFF POSSIBILITIES 
With all the THCSRR components dissected and model 
drivers identified, one can begin to better appreciate the 
tradeoff possibilities inherent in sizing the Navy's medical 
establishment. This section will first address those 
tradeoffs which the model highlights. These include the 
following: 
• Rotation policy versus retention 
• Active duty providers versus civilian providers 
• Line personnel versus medical staff personnel 
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Also of interest in this discussion are tradeoff 
considerations which are beyond the scope of the THCSRR model. 
These illustrations help to frame the idea of using cost 
benefit analysis to make informed tradeoff decisions. 
Examples include the following: 
• General practitioners versus specialists 
• Medical Corps personnel versus personnel in other 
medical designators 
• Capital equipment/technology versus medical personnel 
1.  Within Model Capabilities 
One method of using this model to make tradeoffs is to 
focus on the relationship between rotation policies and 
retention rates. Altering current sea tour lengths outlined 
in the Officer and Enlisted Transfer Manuals from 24 to 36 
months for most medical officer NOBCs and from 12 to 24 months 
for surgical specialties would decrease the RB multipliers, 
thereby decreasing the required CONUS relief billets. The 
same results would occur if enlisted medical personnel changed 
to a 36 month INUS and 36 month OUTUS rotation schedule. 
Further study has revealed a potential decrease in enlisted RB 
billet requirements of between 13 and 25 percent depending on 
the NEC.54 In addition, all officer and enlisted overseas 
tours could be subject to the longer accompanied tour length. 
Although rotation base requirements decrease, there are 
costs associated with such policy changes. Retention rates 
for medical specialties could decrease as a result of 
increased sea duty requirements. Additional forms of 
refresher training may also be required upon reentry into the 
CONUS Medical Treatment Facility system.  These alternatives 
54Measuring the Medical Enlisted Rotation Base and the 
Impact of Force Downsizing, op. cit., p. 25. 
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and their effects on endstrength requirements would have to be 
weighed. Such policy changes would only decrease personnel 
requirements for those specialties with a DTD number greater 
than the WAR number. In all other cases the MOSR component 
would be driven by the wartime requirement, therefore lowering 
the rotation base multiplier would not have an effect on MOSR 
requirements. 
The second type of tradeoff possibility the THCSRR model 
highlights involves substituting active duty medical personnel 
with civilian health care providers. When results of the 
model are compared to programmed endstrength levels, billets 
and corresponding specialties which are in excess of model 
requirements would be candidates for this type of tradeoff. 
Often referred to as make versus buy analysis, this process 
requires careful consideration of several factors unique to 
the medical community. 
First and foremost, all costs associated with the use of 
military personnel should be incorporated, including costs of 
any special incentive pay for particular medical specialties. 
Another important consideration is the possible need for 
additional training or sustainment tails to "grow" those 
particular medical specialties within the current GME program. 
National health care reform would be taken into account 
when conducting future make versus buy analysis for the 
military. Managed care reforms may encourage increased 
reliance upon primary care physicians. These doctors would 
act as "gatekeepers," referring patients to specialists on a 
more limited basis in an effort to control unnecessary costs. 
The government would require a balance of 50 percent primary 
care physicians and 50 percent specialists nationwide to 
deliver such a program. According to current figures on 
physician supply, it could take until the year 2040 to reach 
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that 50-50 balance.55 The Navy may be able to capitalize on 
this excess supply of trained civilian sector specialists to 
help provide more cost effective health care for 
beneficiaries. 
The effects of recent changes in Department of Defense 
health care management initiatives would also need to be 
considered in any make versus buy analysis. Financial 
resources for the DoD medical components have traditionally 
been based in part on historical workload. This created an 
incentive structure geared more toward increasing the MTF 
workload and less on using resources efficiently. 
The DoD has adopted a strategy of cost containment using 
capitation budgeting. Under this concept, health care 
services are provided to a defined population for an average 
fixed amount per beneficiary. Since there are no financial 
incentives for workload inflation, this methodology minimizes 
inappropriate increases in health care services and reduces 
the unnecessary provision of more costly care that is not 
clinically appropriate.56 
The DoD is also introducing new TRICARE initiatives for 
non-active duty beneficiaries which mark the transition to a 
managed care concept of operations. This includes variations 
of the standard CHAMPUS program which utilize private sector 
delivery systems such as Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMO). These efforts are designed to increase efficiency and 
lower costs of military health care. Their successful 
implementation could have serious effects on the number and 
55Merritt, J., President, Merritt, Hawkins and 
Associates, Medical Staff Strategy Report, 1994, pp. 10-11. 
56Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs, Subject:  Preparing the Military Health 
Services System for Capitation-based Resource Allocation, 23 
July 1993, p. 2. 
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type  of  active duty medical personnel  required during 
peacetime. 
The bottom line question relating to a make versus buy 
analysis should be: Are these personnel and the care they 
were providing under the old system still necessary given 
current management initiatives? If they answer is yes, is it 
cost effective to have active duty military providing that 
care? 
For some of the NOBCs which are more administrative in 
nature, tradeoffs between Navy line community personnel and 
medical personnel may be considered.  Examples of MSC billets 
of this nature include health care and patient administration, 
accounting,  and medical logistics administration.   Cost 
benefit analysis could center on using personnel already 
existing in other Navy line communities for these requirements 
instead of MSC personnel. This type of tradeoff would only be 
feasible for those line communities which have an excess 
supply of personnel. Benefits include an overall reduction in 
required Navy endstrength and benefits associated with the 
standardization of certain Navy-wide administrative functions. 
Costs may include any additional  training required to 
assimilate these line personnel into the medical community. 
The evacuation policy which helps drive wartime 
requirements can also be used to make tradeoffs between active 
duty Navy personnel in the line community and those in the 
medical community. A longer evacuation policy results in a 
greater potential for returning casualties to duty without 
evacuation from the theater, thus reducing the requirement for 
line forces and increasing the requirement for medical forces. 
The shorter the policy, the more patients are transferred to 
CONUS without returning to duty and the more replacements a 
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theater commander will require to maintain a given fighting 
strength.57 
Each option entails certain costs. The longer evacuation 
policy would require additional logistical support including 
airlift, sealift, supplies and medical personnel. The shorter 
policy would necessitate additional replacement forces from 
the line community and a CONUS medical structure capable of 
sustaining larger numbers of evacuees. Decisionmakers 
continually weigh the marginal benefits of a certain 
evacuation policy against these added costs for a given level 
of capability. 
One may argue that funding for all these resources is 
supplied by the same source which would negate the cost 
implications. However, as outlined in Chapter II, the 
resource allocation process governed by the PPBS is extremely 
competitive and involves not only fiscal but political 
considerations. The size of the active duty medical 
establishment relative to the rest of the military is an issue 
which is currently receiving a great deal of attention not 
only in the Navy but throughout the entire DoD. 
2.  Beyond Model Capabilities 
A potential tradeoff exists between the number of active 
duty general practitioners and active duty medical 
specialists. The model does not take this type of tradeoff 
into account primarily because it assumes that this mix is 
fixed during wartime, on ships, and in POF billets. From a 
readiness perspective, one may consider the possibility of 
substituting more general practitioners for specialists, 
depending on the nature of the assignment. Benefits would 
include decreased sustainment and training costs and increased 
ability to function independently in isolated billets. In 
addition, these types of tradeoffs could increase flexibility 
57733 Study (Draft), op. cit., p. 16, 
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in dealing with the uncertainty associated with demand for 
wartime medical care. Navy leadership may benefit from 
examining the feasibility of implementing this form of 
crosstraining to eliminate the necessity of separate 
specialist and designator requirements for certain billets. 
Particular tradeoffs could be considered for structure- 
based medical requirements on ships and with the Fleet Marine 
Force. Recall from Chapter III, each class of ship has a 
specific mix of physicians, dentists, nurses, corpsmen, 
Independent Duty Technicians, Physician Assistants, and Dental 
Technicians. Given the uncertain demand for health care in 
these environments, particularly during war, the optimal ratio 
of physicians to each of these other medical specialties 
should be considered. 
Utilizing sufficiently trained Physician Assistants or 
Independent Duty Technicians in lieu of Medical Corps 
personnel could decrease costs associated with sustainment, 
special pay, and rotation base depending on differing sea tour 
policies. If demand for medical care exceeds expectations, 
costs of such a tradeoff could include decreased medical 
capability. 
A final tradeoff possibility which is beyond the scope of 
the model deals with substituting capital equipment for 
medical personnel. Technological advances in the medical 
field can decrease personnel requirements as well as improve 
health care and readiness standards. Costs associated with 
such a tradeoff would include procurement, maintenance, and 
training costs as well as costs associated with potential 
system upgrades. 
G.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed the THCSRR model at two primary 
levels. First, overall THCSRR numbers were examined to 
provide a broad perspective on the relative sizes of Navy 
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medical endstrength requirements by designator and mission. 
Secondly, more detailed examination of each component of the 
model at the NOBC/NEC and subspecialty levels identified the 
policies, practices, and missions which drive Navy medical 
manpower. Factors such as evacuation policy, WIA and DNBI 
rates, tour lengths, and rotation policies have been 
highlighted in this chapter as elements which drive medical 
manpower readiness requirements. 
Using these model drivers, illustrations of tradeoff 
possibilities and cost benefit analysis were also introduced. 
Examples included tradeoffs between rotation policy and 
retention as well as substituting Navy personnel in the 
medical community with personnel in the line community. A 
final possibility this chapter explored involved tradeoffs 
between using active duty or civilian health care providers in 
certain billets. This discussion was framed in terms of a 
make versus buy decision for those programmed endstrength 
levels in excess of model requirements. Factors such as 
special incentive pay, national health care reform and DoD 
management initiatives were highlighted for consideration. 
Additional analysis examined those tradeoffs not 
specifically addressed by the THCSRR model. These included 
changes in the ratio of specialists to general practitioners, 
as well as tradeoffs involving physicians and personnel with 
other medical designators. Finally, costs and benefits of 
substituting capital equipment and medical personnel were 
examined. Although not all ideas presented in this chapter 
are necessarily feasible, possibilities listed represent ways 
of looking at situations and probing for more efficient 
methods to accomplish the mission of Navy Medicine. 
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V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study has been to examine a model 
used by Navy Medicine to determine medical manpower readiness 
requirements. Primary emphasis has been on analyzing the 
model from a financial management perspective. Specific 
research goals delineated in Chapter I include the following: 
• Identify the primary components, underlying principles, 
and assumptions behind the THCSRR model 
• Using the model, identify the percentages of medical 
personnel associated with the different missions of 
Navy Medicine 
• Discuss the implications of changing the underlying 
assumptions of the model 
• Illustrate tradeoff possibilities which exist within 
the context of the model 
• Assess areas of the model which could be made more 
effective 
• Based on analysis of this model, draw conclusions 
regarding the future size of the Department of the Navy 
medical establishment 
Chapter I provided background information to frame the 
issue of medical readiness. It highlighted the complex 
relationship between the wartime mission and peacetime benefit 
mission and the inability to completely separate the two when 
making decisions on sizing the active duty force. This is 
primarily due to the fact that personnel required for the 
wartime mission are also used for the peacetime benefit. The 
chapter then outlined the events and issues which led to the 
creation of the THCSRR model. Drastic changes in the 
political environment and threats faced by the armed forces in 
addition to increasingly tighter fiscal constraints were 
listed as primary factors which brought  the  issue of 
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"rightsizing" the total force structure to the forefront of 
the bargaining table. 
Chapter I also discussed the congressionally mandated 733 
Study which conjectured that only half of the active duty 
physicians projected to be available in fiscal year 1999 would 
be required to meet wartime medical demands. The startling 
results of this study, together with a Center for Naval 
Analysis study, served as the impetus for the Navy Surgeon 
General's THCSRR model. 
Chapter II examined the DoD management tool known as the 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. This is the 
arena in which critical decisions are made regarding the size 
and type of forces, equipment, and infrastructure which are to 
be funded in the DoD. A model such as the THCSRR would have 
to operate successfully within the political and 
organizational realm of this management system in order to be 
of any value to the Navy. This chapter focused on the 
Programming process and the development of a six year 
financial plan for the Navy called the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM). Although the primary emphasis was on this 
document, planning documents directly impacting the 
programming process, such as the Defense Planning Guidance, 
were also introduced. The three phases of programming for 
Navy medical assets were identified and explained. Primary 
participants in the medical community, major documents, and 
specific outcomes of each phase were also delineated. 
The final section of this chapter described the unique 
interaction between Navy Medicine, the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and Congress when 
programming for medical endstrength. Resulting issues such as 
separate medical POMs, congressional mandates on medical 
manpower levels, and certification of CHAMPUS cost containment 
were examined. 
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Chapter III investigated the primary components and 
underlying principles behind the THCSRR model. It broke the 
model down into four components: Wartime, Day-to-Day 
Operations, MOSR, and Sustainment. The MOSR is created by 
taking the union of the wartime and day-to-day operational 
requirements. The THCSRR consists of the MOSR plus the 
Sustainment component. With these relationships defined, the 
chapter analyzed each component separately. 
The Wartime component was introduced first, including a 
description of workload-based and structure-based 
requirements. The chapter described tools such as 
Illustrative Planning Scenarios and the Medical Planning 
Module which are used to determine workload requirements by 
simulating the flow of patients through echelons of medical 
care during probable combat situations. In addition, it 
defined factors such as wounded in action and disease non- 
battle injury rates. Structure-based requirements were 
defined as those personnel organic to specific units needed 
during wartime or to sustain wartime units. The role of the 
Total Force Manpower Management System and documents such as 
ROC/POE and TO&E were also addressed. 
The chapter then discussed the Day-to-Day component, 
which consists of those medical billets which must be filled 
for the Navy to perform its operational mission on a daily 
basis. It defined the Peacetime Operational Forces (POF) 
overseas, in the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, and in isolated 
duty stations and described methods and policies used to 
calculate a rotation base to support these POF billets. 
After providing sample MOSR calculations, Chapter III 
analyzed the Sustainment component of the model. Sustainment 
was defined in terms of four elements: loss rates, training 
billets, mission continuity, and TPP&H. The current structure 
of the Graduate Medical Education program and its impact on 
sustainment was explained.   This chapter also described 
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constraints imposed by nationally recognized accreditation 
requirements for internship and residency programs. 
Chapter IV served as the primary analytical portion of 
this study. It began by providing overall results of the 
model, including the relative number of billets currently 
being utilized in each of Navy Medicine's missions. MOSR 
requirements were analyzed at the subspecialty level in an 
effort to distinguish between those billets dominated by the 
day-to-day operational requirement and those driven by the 
wartime requirement. Subsequent sections of this chapter 
outlined factors driving each component of the model. These 
included casualty rates, evacuation policy, as well as Navy 
rotation and tour length policies. In addition, specific 
subspecialties required for only one component of the model 
were listed. 
The final section of Chapter IV illustrated how a 
financial manager might capitalize on such a model to initiate 
cost benefit analysis and consider tradeoff possibilities. 
The first tradeoff scenario examined changing current rotation 
policies. The benefits of a smaller rotation base requirement 
and costs associated with potential reductions in retention 
were highlighted. Next, the concept of substituting active 
duty medical personnel with civilian providers was analyzed in 
terms of a make versus buy decision. Factors influencing such 
a decision were discussed, including special incentive pay, 
national health care reform, and recent DoD management 
initiatives such as capitation budgeting. Tradeoffs 
associated with changes in the evacuation policy were also 
examined. These involved the size of Navy personnel in the 
line communities relative to those in medical fields and the 
associated effects on sealift, airlift, and supply 
requirements. 
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Additional analysis examined those tradeoffs not 
specifically addressed by the THCSRR model. These included 
changes in the ratio of specialists to general practitioners, 
as well as tradeoffs involving physicians and personnel with 
other medical designators. The benefits and costs of 
crosstraining in an environment of uncertain demand were 
highlighted. Finally, this chapter touched on the concept of 
substituting medical personnel with capital equipment. Such 
technological advances might decrease personnel requirements 
while improving health care and readiness standards. Costs 
would include procurement, maintenance, system upgrade, and 
training expenditures. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
As shown in the previous chapters, a full exploration of 
the THCSRR model involves many facets of the Navy health care 
system. Topics relating to the model have ranged in diversity 
from current planning and programming mechanisms and medical 
combat structures to the Navy billet file and congressionally 
mandated endstength requirements. This section of the chapter 
draws several conclusions based on the research and analysis 
conducted on the THCSRR model. First, the model itself will 
be addressed, followed by conclusions regarding other aspects 
of the medical force sizing issue. 
1.  The Model 
After analyzing the assumptions and principles behind the 
THCSRR model, several inferences can be made about its 
construction. Perhaps one of the most useful aspects of the 
model in an environment of rightsizing is the manner in which 
it links medical personnel to particular platforms at sea. 
Decreases in Navy line community assets resulting in ship 
decommissioning or the elimination of FMF units can be 
directly translated into decreases in associated medical 
endstrength levels.  In a broad sense, this model breaks down 
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Navy medical billets into mission areas, including those which 
are and are not required for wartime. This information alone 
is valuable in providing Navy leadership with a starting point 
for tradeoff analysis decisions. How does one know what is in 
excess of readiness unless baseline requirements are defined? 
In addition to these points, there are also some 
potential problem areas which deserve attention. When a model 
is used to address a complicated issue such as medical 
manpower levels, data input has an enormous impact on results. 
Much of the information critical to the model may be known 
only imprecisely and is determined in part by current 
capabilities and institutional incentives. 
An example of this phenomenon lies in the Navy Total 
Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS), commonly known as 
the billet file. Because the methodology behind a large 
portion of the model relies entirely on this system, 
information contained in it should be as accurate as possible. 
TFMMS reflects only authorized billets and not actual numbers 
and types of personnel in inventory. Recall that Navy 
Medicine keeps a separate database called the body file to 
track actual medical personnel. If the THCSRR model is to be 
used to make decisions regarding the actual number and skills 
mix of Navy medical personnel, there may be a disconnect. 
Methods used to determine OCONUS and ICONUS MTF billets 
in TFMMS may require some additional work as well. Recall 
from Chapter III that billets not required for war or organic 
to specific platforms or units are determined by Efficiency 
Review (ER) procedures. All Navy communities were recently 
tasked with conducting ERs to establish a baseline of required 
active duty personnel. The line community used a team of 
third party investigators to assess requirements at each 
activity and ensure consistency. The medical community, on 
the other hand, tasked each activity to conduct its own ER. 
Although both alternatives are acceptable methods of reaching 
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the same goal, standardization and consistency in this arena 
could enhance the credibility of TFMMS. 
One final assessment regarding the model itself centers 
around the 733 Study. The wartime portion of the THCSRR model 
is based almost entirely on this congressionally mandated 
examination of medical requirements. Although the actual 
methodology behind the wartime portion of this study is sound, 
the degree to which the model relies on it may not be 
beneficial for users in the long term. The 733 is a static 
study designed to provide a snapshot in time of the Military 
Health Services System, whereas the THCSRR is designed to be 
a dynamic model capable of providing current information on 
medical readiness requirements. At this early stage, the two 
are still compatible; however, there will soon come a time 
when another study will be required. 
2. Model Implementation 
A discussion of conclusions naturally leads to the issue 
of incorporating the THCSRR model within the auspices of the 
current PPBS. Methods used in developing the wartime portion 
of the 733 Study closely resemble those which are 
theoretically part of the Planning phase. The Defense 
Planning Guidance, Medical Planning Module, wounded in action 
and DNBI rates, and evacuation policy are certainly not new 
concepts. The question which may arise is, "Why did Congress 
need to mandate an examination of DoD medical requirements for 
wartime?". Given the results of the study, perhaps a better 
question would be, "Is the current PPBS capable of providing 
the information and fostering the kinds of decisions which are 
necessary in the military medical community?" 
The THCSRR model takes many elements of medical manpower 
analysis into account, including accession, training, and 
rotation policies. However, in the shared power world of the 
PPBS, no one agency or policy-making body has control over all 
these factors. As stated in Chapter II, the medical community 
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must contend with congressional interest in health care as 
well as the division of programming responsibilities resulting 
from the creation of the Defense Health Program. Tradeoffs 
which are deemed cost-effective to the Navy as a whole may or 
may not be implemented in an arena where responsibility and 
control over resources is divided among competing 
stakeholders. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The final section of this study offers recommendations 
relating to the THCSRR model and medical manpower issues 
involved in its use. Some would require minor adjustments to 
current policy while others would entail DoD-wide 
restructuring efforts. In either case, ideas presented here 
are designed to highlight specific areas and offer alternative 
measures of ensuring the continued provision of medical 
readiness and cost-effective health care. An additional 
portion of this section will list areas recommended for 
further research. 
1. The THCSRR Model and Related Medical Issues 
First and foremost, a single definition of medical 
readiness should be agreed upon in the DoD. Any joint efforts 
or comparisons between services will be mute without consensus 
on this point. Readiness in general has been defined as the 
ability of forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment to 
deliver the outputs for which they were designed, including 
the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable 
delay.58 In structuring future discussions on medical 
readiness, this element of deployability may want to be 
considered. In addition, personnel training should be 
reflected in a readiness definition.  This would not only 
58Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Dictionary of Military Terms, 1990, p. 252. 
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entail displaying adequate skills in a particular medical 
field but would also include the ability to function in an 
operational environment onboard ship, with the Fleet Marine 
Force, and in other areas of the combat medical structure. To 
maintain some consistency with line communities, the peacetime 
benefit mission should not be considered in a DoD definition 
of medical readiness. 
All active duty medical personnel in excess of readiness 
requirements should be subject to some type of make versus buy 
analysis in order to ensure cost-effective health care is 
being provided. The effects of national health care reform on 
the supply and demand of civilian specialists should be 
considered. Cost implications of capitation budgeting and 
TRICARE initiatives should also be taken into account. 
Several steps can be taken in order to better integrate 
financial decisions regarding medical manpower. First, 
congressional floors on endstrength levels and the 
certification requirement for CHAMPUS cost containment both 
limit tradeoff possibilities by specialty. Consideration 
should therefore be given to eliminating the constraints they 
impose on the PPBS process. Secondly, thought should be given 
to altering the composition of overall Navy endstrength 
numbers to exclude medical personnel. Although overall Navy 
readiness requirements are derived from the Illustrative 
Planning Scenarios of the DPG, the THCSRR model has 
highlighted the fact that medical personnel readiness 
requirements are driven by unique factors which may need extra 
consideration. The inescapable tendency to "share the pain" 
of personnel cuts regardless of effects on medical readiness 
could thus be avoided. Given the current environment of 
downsizing, full implementation of this recommendation may not 
necessarily be practical or politically realistic. 
Perhaps one of the most complex relationships to 
understand is that which exists between the services and the 
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs (OASD(HA)). This is a relatively new relationship 
which is still in the process of developing, especially in 
terms of the PPBS and resource allocation decisions. Breaking 
up resources for the medical community among various players 
in the PPBS reflects the need to share power but may hinder 
implementation of models such as the THCSRR. Two POMs may not 
produce better or more effective financial plans than one POM. 
A single POM would limit compartmentalization and enable 
better tradeoff analysis and higher levels of readiness in the 
long term. Ensuring that all services operate under the same 
medical guidelines has its obvious benefits; however, these 
may be undermined by the added complexity of a new 
organization with only partial control of resources. 
A general recommendation would be to locate authority for 
medical assets with either the services or ASD(HA) instead of 
a combination of both. Recent studies support the 
consolidation of all military medical resources, including 
medical personnel. Advantages which have been cited include 
an increased ability to make tradeoffs among the three 
military departments and foster more cross-sharing of 
resources. In addition, a consolidated management authority 
could decrease the risk of budgetary pressures on the DoD 
jeopardizing medical readiness.59 
Final recommendations center around future adaptations of 
the THCSRR and other readiness models. Rather than linking a 
model to a static report such as the 733 Study, it may be more 
advisable to rely on current DoD planning mechanisms as 
conceptual foundations. Since military models will be 
implemented through the PPBS, linking them to planning and 
Congressional Budget Office, Easing the Burden: 
Restructuring and Consolidating Defense Support Activities 
July 1994, p. 23. 
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programming forums and methodologies typically used in this 
system enhances the longevity of the model. In addition to 
these adaptations, future models may want to consider 
incorporating tradeoff possibilities listed in Chapter IV. 
These include but are not limited to substituting technology 
for medical personnel and making tradeoffs between general 
practitioners and medical specialists. 
2.  Areas for Further Research 
The following list provides general topics relating to 
this study which may require further analysis: 
• Using similar methodology, create a manpower readiness 
requirements model for other communities in the 
Department of the Navy 
• Apply this type of model and tradeoff analysis to the 
medical communities of other services 
• Analyze the effects of capitation budgeting and new 
TRICARE initiatives on costs associated with providing 
health care and use the results to illustrate make 
versus buy analysis for military health care providers 
• Study the effects of an excess supply of civilian 
medical specialists on the Navy Graduate Medical 
Education program 
• Develop methods of measuring medical readiness which 
take into account the degree that skills requirements 
for wartime are fulfilled by medical personnel 
• Adapt the existing TFMMS database to distinguish 
between those billets which are required for medical 
readiness and those which are not 
• Develop alternative medical readiness models which 
incorporate tradeoffs between general practitioners and 
medical specialists as well as the possibility of 
substituting capital equipment and technology for 
medical personnel 
• Investigate methods for addressing the efficient use of 




APPENDIX A.  MOSR DATABASE 
NOBC PSÜB POF WAR 
Dental Technician 
0000 0000 486 396 1.5 135 621 1640 
8703 0000 120 0 1.5 180 300 280 
8705 0000 0 0 0 0 0 5 
8707 0000 397 316 1.51 122 519 454 
8732 0000 26 5 1.52 32 58 47 
8752 0000 57 38 1.47 28 85 152 
8753 0000 49 0 1.51 74 123 154 
8765 0000 0 0 0 0 0 2 
8783 0000 5 0 1.8 8 13 0 
Hospital Corpsman 
0000 0000 2073 1568 1.28 646 2719 9778 
8401 0000 80 44 1.27 46 126 98 
8402 0000 118 0 1.28 151 269 463 
8403 0000 15 0 1.27 19 34 88 
8404 0000 3263 2300 1.28 1233 4496 5008 
8406 0000 343 52 1.28 372 715 883 
8407 0000 37 10 1.3 35 72 119 
8408 0000 6 4 1.5 3 9 32 
8409 0000 26 4 1.27 28 54 31 
8416 0000 4 0 1.25 5 9 21 
8424 0000 67 0 1.28 86 153 1 
8425 0000 560 0 1.28 717 1277 1536 
8427 0000 50 12 1.29 49 99 0 
8432 0000 334 30 1.28 389 723 513 
8445 0000 12 10 1.5 3 15 39 
8446 0000 7 4 1.33 4 11 23 
8451 0000 104 67 1.27 47 151 278 
8452 0000 149 38 1.3 142 291 501 
8454 0000 5 2 1.33 4 9 7 
8463 0000 32 7 1.28 32 64 69 
8466 0000 31 16 1.27 19 50 108 
8467 0000 6 0 1.33 8 14 0 
8472 0000 3 1 1.5 3 6 17 
8478 0000 101 0 1.28 129 230 266 
8479 0000 20 11 1.33 12 32 30 






































NOBC PSUB POF *NROT RB X RB DTD WAR MOSR 
8483 0000 329 233 1.28 123 452 1332 1332 
8485 0000 32 19 1.3 17 49 131 131 
8486 0000 11 7 1.25 5 16 25 25 
8489 0000 35 27 1.25 10 45 156 156 
8491 0000 89 0 1.28 114 203 0 203 
8492 0000 97 32 1.28 83 180 264 264 
8493 0000 50 5 1.29 58 108 201 201 
8494 0000 32 0 1.28 41 73 1 73 
8495 0000 9 8 1 1 10 18 18 
8496 0000 8 0 1.25 10 18 11 18 
8501 0000 150 103 1.28 60 210 498 498 
8503 0000 5 0 1.2 6 11 15 15 
8505 0000 10 0 1.3 13 23 55 55 
8506 0000 260 60 1.28 256 516 697 697 
8541 0000 25 15 1.3 13 38 135 135 




0 29 29 
0030 1800 1 0 2 2 3 0 3 
0031 0000 1 0 2 2 3 0 3 
OOXX 0000 86 0 1.47 126 212 252 252 
0101 1612 25 0 1.48 37 62 82 82 
0101 1641 7 0 1.43 10 17 0 17 
0101 1642 1 0 2 2 3 1 3 
0101 1647 1 0 2 2 3 1 3 
0102 1600 151 0 0 0 151 238 238 
0102 1601 48 0 0 0 48 59 59 
0102 1602 3 0 0 0 3 0 3 
0105 1611 3 0 1.33 4 7 3 7 
0105 1614 28 0 1.46 41 69 27 69 
0107 1605 30 0 0 0 30 32 32 
0108 1600 5 0 1.4 7 12 0 12 
0108 1601 2 0 1.5 3 5 0 5 
0108 1602 1 0 2 2 3 0 3 
0108 1610 114 0 1.47 167 281 199 281 
0109 1616 13 0 1.46 19 32 59 59 
0110 1602 157 0 0 0 157 244 244 
0110 1605 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Olli 1618 5 0 1.4 7 12 19 19 
0115 1622 18 0 1.44 26 44 45 45 
100 
ONOBC PSDB POF *NROT RB X RB DTD WAR MOSR 
0115 1623 2 0 1.5 3 5 2 5 
0118 1540 24 0 1.46 35 59 158 158 
0121 1620 2 0 1.5 3 5 9 9 
0131 1670 19 0 1.47 28 47 45 47 
0150 1680 8 0 1.5 12 20 48 48 
0150 1685 1 0 2 2 3 3 3 
0160 1601 2 0 1.5 3 5 0 5 
0160 1628 9 0 1.44 13 22 22 22 
0163 1624 16 0 1.44 23 39 27 39 
0166 1626 2 0 1.5 3 5 8 8 
0169 1630 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0214 1500 56 0 1.46 82 138 230 230 
0224 1515 0 0 0 0 0 21 21 
0229 1510 35 0 1.46 51 86 46 86 
0234 1524 5 0 1.4 7 12 27 27 
0244 1516 22 0 1.45 32 54 135 135 
0249 1522 6 0 1.5 9 15 27 27 
0254 1520 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
0264 1507 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 




12 20 20 
0030 1800 1 0 2 2 3 12 12 
OOXX 0000 14 0 1.43 20 34 18 34 
0335 1700 299 0 1.44 431 730 507 703 
0335 1725 31 0 1.45 45 76 0 76 
0340 1740 4 0 1.5 6 10 4 10 
0540 1745 1 0 2 2 3 0 3 
0510 1710 18 0 1.44 26 44 23 44 
0525 1700 9 0 1.44 13 22 0 22 
0525 1725 47 0 1.45 68 115 75 115 
0535 1735 5 0 1.4 7 12 5 12 
0545 1745 1 0 2 2 3 2 3 
0550 1700 3 0 1.5 4 7 0 7 
0550 1750 26 0 1.46 38 64 58 64 
0550 1760 1 0 2 2 3 0 3 
0560 1760 18 0 1.44 26 44 18 44 
0569 1700 6 0 1.5 9 15 0 15 
0569 1769 27 0 1.44 39 66 33 66 
0575 1775 1 0 2 2 3 1 3 
101 
NOBC PSUB POF *NROT RB X RB DTD WAR MOSR 
0579 1795 6 0 1.5 9 15 6 15 
0580 1780 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Medical Service Corps 
0030 1800 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
0031 1805 30 0 1.3 39 69 43 69 
OOXX 1800 88 0 1.3 114 202 511 511 
OOXX 1802 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
OOXX 1805 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
0113 1893 61 0 1.3 79 140 190 190 
0800 1800 55 0 1.31 72 127 264 264 
0800 1801 3 0 1.33 4 7 0 7 
0800 1803 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 
0801 1800 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
0808 1801 14 0 1.29 18 32 42 42 
0814 1877 7 0 1.29 9 16 10 16 
0820 1800 9 0 1.33 12 21 17 21 
0822 1804 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0840 1810 1 0 1 1 2 27 27 
0841 1815 14 0 1.29 18 32 38 38 
0841 1819 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
0841 1821 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
0845 1825 12 0 1.33 16 28 32 32 
0847 1828 1 0 1 1 2 29 29 
0848 1835 1 0 1 1 2 14 14 
0849 1836 20 0 1.3 26 46 2 46 
0851 1840 20 0 1.3 26 46 52 52 
0851 1841 4 0 1.25 5 9 4 9 
0852 1844 5 0 1.4 7 12 2 12 
0854 1845 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 
0860 1850 10 0 1.3 13 23 32 32 
0861 1860 25 0 1.32 33 58 73 73 
0862 1861 45 0 1.31 59 104 78 104 
0866 1865 17 0 1.29 22 39 61 61 
0868 1870 16 0 1.31 21 37 23 37 
0871 1862 8 0 1.25 10 18 8 18 
0873 1873 13 0 1.3 17 30 29 30 
0874 1874 5 0 1.4 7 12 12 12 
0876 1876 2 0 1.5 3 5 12 12 
0880 1880 21 0 1.29 27 48 33 48 
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NOBC PSDB POF *NROT RB X RB DTD WAR 
0887 1887 22 0 1.31 29 51 45 
0892 1892 1 0 1 1 2 12 
1005 0031 3 0 1.33 4 7 19 
1005 1802 1 0 1 1 2 0 
1015 1800 4 0 1.25 5 9 4 
0150 0031 21 0 1.29 27 48 12 
1918 0032 3 0 1.3 4 7 1 
1918 1800 2 0 1.5 3 5 1 
1918 1802 22 0 1.31 29 51 18 
2615 1800 19 0 1.32 25 44 9 
3965 0033 4 0 1.25 5 9 11 
9705 0095 1 0 1 1 2 1 





0005 1900 3 0 1.33 4 7 35 
0005 1901 12 0 1.25 15 27 10 
0005 1910 1 0 1 1 2 0 
0005 1940 1 0 1 1 2 0 
0020 1900 2 0 1.5 3 5 165 
0020 1901 2 0 1.5 3 5 0 
0020 1910 8 0 1.25 10 18 7 
0020 1920 2 0 1.5 3 5 2 
0020 1940 2 0 1.5 3 5 3 
0020 1950 1 0 1 1 2 1 
0028 1900 15 0 1.27 19 34 11 
0028 1910 37 0 1.24 46 83 270 
0028 1920 20 0 1.25 25 45 14 
0028 1922 2 0 1.5 3 5 2 
0028 1923 3 0 1.33 4 7 2 
0028 1930 4 0 1.25 5 9 4 
0028 1940 1 0 1 1 2 1 
0028 1945 1 0 1 1 2 0 
0028 1950 1 0 1 1 2 . 1 
0028 1960 2 0 1.5 3 5 2 
0049 1907 9 0 1.22 11 20 18 
0904 1960 52 0 1.25 65 117 396 
0904 1964 1 0 1 1 2 1 
0925 1910 1 0 1 1 2 1 









































NOBC PSUB POF *NROT RB X RB DTD WAR MOSR 
0935 1900 48 0 1.25 60 108 36 108 
0935 1910 2 0 1.5 3 5 1 5 
0935 1920 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 
0935 1922 2 0 1.33 3 5 1 5 
0935 1940 53 0 1.25 66 119 218 218 
0935 1945 26 0 1.27 33 59 23 59 
0944 1900 120 0 1.25 150 270 629 629 
0944 1910 10 0 1.3 13 23 5 23 
0944 1920 14 0 1.29 18 32 14 32 
0944 1922 3 0 1.33 4 7 2 7 
0944 1923 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 
0944 1960 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 
0952 1972 46 0 1.26 58 104 193 193 
0963 1974 5 0 1.2 6 11 5 11 
0963 1976 18 0 1.28 23 41 68 68 
0963 1980 4 0 1.25 5 9 3 9 
0963 1981 6 0 1.33 8 14 4 14 
3215 1903 11 0 1.27 14 25 8 25 
* NROT are those enlisted billets designated as E-4 and below which do not 
require a rotation base according to the THCSRR model. 
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APPENDIX B.   LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ACGME American Council for Graduate Medical Education 
AFHPSP Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program 
BAM Baseline Assessment Memorandum 
BUMED Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
BUPERS Bureau of Naval Personnel 
CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services 
CINC Commander-in-Chief 
CINCPACFLT Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet 
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CNA Center for Naval Analysis 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CONUS Continental United States 
CRTS Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ship 
DC Dental Corps 
DESRON Destroyer Squadron 
DHP Defense Health Program 
DMPA Defense Medical Program Activity 
DNBI disease non-battle injury 
DNCPPG Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning and 
Programming Guidance 
DoD Department of Defense 
DPG Defense Planning Guidance 
DPRB Defense Planning and Resources Board 
DPSB Defense Programming Strategy Board 
DT Dental Technician 
DTD Day-to-Day component 
ER Efficiency Review 
ESC Executive Steering Committee 


































Fleet Marine Force 
Fleet Marine Force Manual 
Full Time Out Service 
Future Years Defense Plan 
graduate medical education 
General Medical Officer 
Health Care Administration 
Health Care Science 
Hospital Corpsman 
Health Maintenance Organization 
Investment Balance Review 
Isolated Continental United States 
Integrated Priority List 
Illustrative Planning Scenarios 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Mission Area 
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
Medical Corps 
mission continuity element 
Military Entrance Processing Station 
Medical Health Services System 
Military Construction appropriation 
Medical Integrated Priority List 
Medical Operational Support Requirement 
Medical Program Guidance 
Medical Planning Module 
Military Personnel, Marine Corps appropriation 
major regional conflict 
Medical Service Corps 
Medical Treatment Facility 
Navy Active Duty Deferred Scholarship 































Naval Supply Systems Command 
Nurse Corps 
Navy Capabilities Mobilization Plan 
Navy Enlisted Classification 
National Military Strategy Document 
Naval Officer Billet Classification 
no rotation base required 
National Security Strategy 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs 
Outside the Continental United States 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Office of the Secretary Of Defense for Program Analysis 
and Evaluation 
Program Decision Memorandum 
Program Development Review Committee 
POM Medical Assessment Task Force 
Plan of Action and Milestones 
Peacetime Operational Forces 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
Primary Subspecialty 
Resources and Requirements Review Board 
rotation base 
rotation base multiplier 
Reserve Delay 
Reserve Immediate 
Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational 
Environment 
Residency Review Committee 
Support Area 



















Secretary of Defense 
Secretary of the Navy 
Sponsor Program Proposal 
Sponsor Program Proposal Document 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
Hospital Ship 
Type Assignment Code 
Total Force Manpower Manangement System 
Total Health Care Support Readiness Requirement 
Table of Organization and Equipment 
Total Obligational Authority 
Transients, Patients, Prisoners and Holding 
Unit Identification Code 
Undersea Medical Officer 
Uniformed Services University of the Health Services 
Wartime component 
wounded in action 
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